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THE DECADE OF DEMOCRACY’S DEMISE 
JAMES SAMPLE* 
In the decade since Citizens United v. FEC, which, while consequential in 
its own right, is also not responsible for all the ills attributed to it by its detractors, 
the Supreme Court has decided a stunning number of what this Article terms to be 
democracy cases. Each respective case is the subject of substantial scholarship within 
its sphere—voting rights, contribution limits, public financing, partisan 
gerrymandering, federal bribery law, and subvariations of each area—Decade of 
Democracy’s Demise seeks to remove that scholarship from the respective topical 
silos, and to develop and analyze a heretofore scarcely considered composite. 
This Article contends that in democracy cases, the judicial minimalists on the 
Court have actually engaged, during the decade, in extensive judicial fact 
finding in order to justify their legal conclusions. In several of these cases the 
Court has shown a willingness to ignore the legislative fact findings of Congress 
(reflected in the McCain-Feingold legislation struck down in both Citizens 
United and McCutcheon v. FEC and in the re-authorization of the Voting 
Rights Act in Shelby County); and of state courts and legislatures (reflected in 
American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock and Arizona Free 
Enterprise v. Bennett). Indeed, within the democracy arena, the Court has 
deferred to legislative fact finding basically only when the fact-finding body was 
itself hostile to participatory democracy, and actually acted upon that hostility. 
Examples of this antiparticipatory deference include the Husted voter purge, the 
Crawford v. Indiana decision in 2008 that, while technically outside the 
defined decade, spawned numerous carbon copy voter ID laws in states around 
the nation, and the deference to legislative redistricting measures that, in the 
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instances of Maryland and North Carolina, are not only inconsistent with one-
person, one-vote norms, but are openly and transparently acknowledged by their 
progenitors to be so. 
The Decade of Democracy’s Demise asserts that while the short-term 
impact of the Court’s decisions in the last decade skews in a favorable direction 
for conservatives, the long-term impact is not necessarily favorable to either 
political party, so much as it favors politically and financially empowered 
interests who seek to employ that empowerment so as to exacerbate their 
antidemocratic advantages. While this dynamic is temporarily good news for 
conservative partisans, it may, at some future juncture be good news for liberal 
partisans (although historically, at least since the Civil Rights era, they are less 
inclined towards antiparticipatory measures), but more importantly than any 
partisan valence, this Article asserts that the broader consequences for American 
democracy are grim indeed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
[T]he Court has fully turned its back on that which I think it has a primary 
responsibility to protect, and that’s our electoral system. 
 




 1. Liam Chalk, Former A.G. Eric Holder Advocates for SCOTUS Terms Limits, Blasts 
Barr at Pomona Talk, STUDENT LIFE (Feb. 18, 2020, 11:38 AM), https://tsl.news/eric-
holder-payton-lecture [https://perma.cc/2Z7C-ZTC2]. 
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The year 2020 is the ten-year anniversary of the Court’s controversial 
Citizens United v. FEC2 decision. Regrettably, this Article asserts that, 
beginning with Citizens United, the Court’s decisions in the prior 
decade have, in the aggregate, dramatically harmed representation-
reinforcing values in our democratic processes. Moreover, this Article 
asserts that the Court majority has aggressively substituted its own fact 
finding when faced with legislative measures that favor participatory 
and equality values. However, the Court majority has shown great 
deference to legislatures when considering measures that are, on their 
face, hostile to participation and equality. While it is impossible to 
prove a results-oriented motive for the discrepancy, this Article 
ultimately contends that it is difficult not to find a brazen lack of 
intellectual consistency in this line of decisions. 
In perhaps the most striking example of this discrepancy, the majority in 
Shelby County v. Holder3 discarded decades of Congressional findings on the 
continued necessity of preventive ex ante safeguards in the Voting Rights 
Act.4 Then, in Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute,5 the Court emphatically 
accepted the findings by Congress to justify an Ohio voting purge, with 
Justice Alito arguing with nary a hint of irony that, “[i]t is not our 
prerogative to judge the reasonableness of that congressional judgment.”6 
Some argue that one aggregate effect of the decade of decisions has 
been an erosion of public trust in the Court, although hard to measure 
and far from the most consequential of the effects.7 Alan Brownstein 
asserts that the impact of these recent decisions 
is to cumulatively increase the influence of the wealthy and powerful in 
the electoral process and to facilitate actions by current government 
officials to manipulate electoral rules and practices in ways that 
entrench their party’s status, and correspondingly, to undermine the 
confidence of the American people in the political system.8 
While preserving the capital of public trust in the Court is important, 
the focus of this Article is the more tangible consequences for rank-
and-file representation-reinforcing norms. In the span of a decade, a 
majority of the Court has imposed its will on nearly every major 
 
 2. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 3. 570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
 4. 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (Supp. 2018). 
 5. 138 S. Ct. 1833 (2018). 
 6. Id. at 1848. 
 7. Alan Brownstein, Supreme Court Rulings Come at a Cost in Public Confidence, HILL (June 
5, 2019, 11:00 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/446936-supreme-court-needs-
to-consider-cumulating-constitutional-costs [https://perma.cc/YS7B-DA3T]. 
 8. Id. 
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element of our democratic processes: from voting to gerrymandering 
to campaign finance and even to bribery and misconduct. In these 
decisions, the Court majority systematically disregarded legislative will 
at their leisure and replaced it with their own judgment of fairness and 
societal need. During the past decade, the Court consistently rejected 
legislative attempts at equalizing access to democracy, dismissed attempts 
by Congress to target quid pro quo corruption, narrowed the definition 
of quid pro quo public corruption to the eye of a needle, and rolled out 
the red carpet for partisan gerrymandering. Even more consequentially, 
there is a snowball effect at play: the decade of new high Court precedent 
in the areas of campaign finance and voting rights gets extended yet 
further as waves of more and more conservative justices join the federal 
bench.9 Despite this, there is a surprising amount of apathy on the 
political left regarding the courts.10 
Part I of this Article details the major Supreme Court decisions of 
the past decade dealing with campaign finance regulations, public 
financing, and a high-profile consideration of a gubernatorial bribery 
charge. Part II considers the Court’s decisions in the areas of voting 
rights, voter suppression, and partisan gerrymandering. 
I.    KEY CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND BRIBERY DECISIONS 
A.   Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission 
In 2010, the United States Supreme Court decided Citizens United v. 
FEC.11 As Alicia Bannon posits, Citizens United is one of “the rare 
Supreme Court decision[s] that many non-lawyers know by name.”12 
The Court’s five-to-four decision garnered widespread notoriety as the 
majority struck down a federal ban on corporate independent 
expenditures,13 in turn overruling decades of precedent, disregarding 
landmark campaign finance legislation, and ultimately ushering in the 
decade of democracy’s demise. 
 
 9. See Dahlia Lithwick, Democrats Still Haven’t Learned Their Lesson About the Courts, 
SLATE (Aug. 1, 2019, 6:06 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/08/ 
democrats-courts-what-will-it-take-debates-election-2020.html 
[https://perma.cc/2GNN-T683]. 
 10. Id. 
 11. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 12. Alicia Bannon, Judicial Elections After Citizens United, 67 DEPAUL L. REV. 169, 174 (2018). 
 13. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 337–39. 
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At issue in Citizens United was a corporation’s right to use its general 
treasury funds to make election-related independent expenditures.14 The 
origin of this case can be traced back to January of 2008, when Citizens 
United, a nonprofit corporation, released a ninety-minute documentary 
entitled Hillary: The Movie, which provided a critical review of Hillary 
Clinton, then candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination.15 
Citizens United initially released Hillary in movie theatres and on DVD, but 
in an effort to expand its exposure, Citizens United sought to use its general 
treasury funds to make Hillary available through video-on-demand within 
thirty days of the 2008 primary elections.16 Citizens United subsequently 
produced advertisements to run on broadcast and cable television in order 
to promote the release of its documentary.17 
However, this tactic directly violated The Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act of 2002 (BCRA),18 a landmark piece of legislation that Congress 
enacted to address large contributions made by corporations and unions to 
political campaigns.19 A provision at the heart of the BCRA, § 441b, 
specifically sought to prohibit corporations and unions from using their 
general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for speech that 
is considered an “electioneering communication,”20 or speech that 
expressly advocates the election or defeat of a particular candidate.21 
 
 14. See id. at 320–21. 
 15. Id. at 319–20. 
 16. Id. at 320–21. 
 17. Id. at 320. 
 18. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81. 
 19. Brief for the Federal Election Commission at 10–11, McConnell v. FEC, 540 
U.S. 93 (2003) (No. 02-1674). The purpose of § 441b was to limit the creation of “sham 
issue ads” that were produced to evade existing campaign finance laws. The ads, created 
primarily by corporations and unions, would ordinarily focus on a named candidate and 
aim to influence both elected officials and the electorate. Congress ultimately found that 
the paper trail left behind by these ads indicated that their true purpose was to influence 
elections, rather than educate the public on social issues. This was supported by the fact 
that the corporations and unions behind these ads hired campaign consultants to devise 
messaging and even had the ads poll tested by professionals. These ads typically aired in 
the days directly leading up to an election and ceased promptly after Election Day—clearly 
intended to impact the upcoming election. The BCRA thus created time-based restrictions 
of thirty and sixty days before an election to only bar those sham ads which were intended 
to influence federal elections. 
 20. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2012) (current version at 52 U.S.C. § 30118 (Supp. 2018)). The Act 
defined an electioneering communication as “any broadcast, cable or satellite 
communication which refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office” and is made 
within 30 days of a primary election or 60 days of a general election. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(a). 
 21. § 434(f)(3)(a). 
1564 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:1559 
Citizens United brought suit against the FEC seeking injunctive and 
declaratory relief out of concern that it risked receiving penalties for 
violating § 441b.22 The district court denied this motion for a preliminary 
injunction and granted summary judgment to the FEC, subsequently 
leading Citizens United to appeal to the Supreme Court.23 
When the case came before the Court, the Justices were tasked with 
determining whether § 441b’s prohibition on corporate independent 
expenditures was unconstitutional as applied to Hillary.24 However, the 
Justices went on to declare that in the exercise of judicial responsibility, 
the Court must consider the facial validity of § 441b because it could 
not resolve the as-applied challenge on narrower grounds without 
“chilling political speech.”25 
In a broad ruling, the Court struck down § 441b’s ban on corporate 
and union independent expenditures, opining that § 441b’s 
prohibition is an outright ban on speech, and as such, is in violation of 
the First Amendment.26 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy 
determined that the First Amendment does not allow the viewpoints 
of certain subjects, such as wealthy corporations, to be disfavored. 
Thus, the majority resolved, any restriction, such as § 441b, that allows 
speech by some and not others is impermissible.27 
In reaching this conclusion, the majority rejected several compelling 
interests advanced by the government in support of restrictions on 
unlimited corporate spending in the electoral context.28 One of these 
compelling interests was the antidistortion rationale contained in Austin 
v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce.29 Under Austin’s rationale, the 
government had a compelling interest in restricting unfettered 
corporate political speech in order to combat the distorting effects that 
large aggregations of wealth have on our electoral process.30 The 
majority conclusively denied this rationale, reasoning that it would 
allow the government to ban political speech just “because the speaker 
 
 22. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 321. 
 23. Id. at 322. 
 24. Id. at 322, 324. 
 25. Id. at 329. 
 26. Id. at 337. 
 27. Id. at 340–41. 
 28. See id. at 348–62. 
 29. 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 30. Id. at 659–60 (holding that the Michigan state law in question was justified in 
that it prevented “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of 
wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little 
or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas”). 
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is an association that has taken on the corporate form.”31 The Court also 
remained unpersuaded by the government’s interest in protecting 
shareholders, as the majority found little evidence of abuse that shareholders 
could not correct “through the procedures of corporate democracy.”32 
Most germane to this Article’s analysis, the Court rejected the 
government’s anticorruption justification, in turn drastically narrowing 
the kind of corruption that could justify regulations on independent 
expenditures to those that involved quid pro quo corruption.33 While the 
majority maintained that wealthy corporate donors did in fact have influence 
over and enhanced access to elected officials, they refused to accept that this 
amounted to the type of corruption that warranted any reasonable 
restrictions.34 The majority concluded that Congress had created “categorical 
bans on speech that are asymmetrical to preventing quid pro quo 
corruption,” and therefore, the “ban on corporate political speech during 
the critical preelection period is not a permissible remedy.”35 
The dissenting justices expressed their disdain toward the brazen 
lack of judicial restraint the majority utilized in handing down this 
decision.36 Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, proffered that the 
majority transformed an as-applied challenge into a facial challenge 
because the Justices were unhappy with the limited nature of the case 
and ultimately seized an opportunity to transform the face of campaign 
finance law.37 In his dissent, Justice Stevens lamented that “[t]he Court 
operates with a sledge hammer rather than a scalpel when it strikes 
down one of Congress’ most significant efforts to regulate the role that 
corporations and unions play in electoral politics.”38 The decision 
amounted to the Court’s complete rejection of the extensive 
Congressional fact finding that went into the passage of the BCRA, with 
little evidence to substantiate their rejection.39 The dissent argued that the 
Court should have pursued a path of judicial deference, particularly in an 
area where Congress developed a record that was a “remarkable testament to 
the energy and ingenuity with which corporations, unions, lobbyists, and 
politicians may go about scratching each other’s backs—and which amply 
 
 31. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349. 
 32. Id. at 361–62 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978)). 
 33. Id. at 357. 
 34. See id. at 359. 
 35. Id. at 361 (emphasis omitted). 
 36. Id. at 398–99 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 399. 
 39. Id. at 399–400. 
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supported Congress’ determination to target a limited set of especially 
destructive practices.”40 Justice Stevens rebuked the majority by declaring that 
we [as Justices] have a vital role to play in ensuring that elections 
remain at least minimally open, fair, and competitive. But it is the 
height of recklessness to dismiss Congress’ years of bipartisan 
deliberation and its reasoned judgment on this basis, without first 
confirming that the statute in question was intended to be, or will 
function as, a restraint on electoral competition.41 
The Citizens United Court, in systematically dismissing the extensive 
congressional fact finding that went into the creation of the BCRA, has 
implicated the efficacy of our democracy. The ruling has enhanced the 
influence of wealthy and powerful corporations in the electoral 
context, threatened the independence of the judiciary, incentivized 
judicial incoherence, and spurred a dangerous erosion of public 
confidence in the integrity of our democratic processes.42 
In analyzing the scope of outside spending in the post-Citizens United 
context, Douglas M. Spencer and Abby K. Wood posit that the most 
notorious consequence of Citizens United has been the emergence of 
independent-expenditure-only political action committees, known as 
Super PACs.43 In the wake of Citizens United, Super PACs have the ability 
to amass exorbitant sums of money from corporations and unions to 
spend in support of or in opposition to candidates.44 In noting the 
potent influence that Super PACs have on federal elections, Spencer 
and Wood contend that “Super PACs have become sidecars to each 
campaign’s motorcycle: ostensibly separate entities, but in essence 
comprising one vehicle.”45 Of particular concern is that the bulk of money 
from Super PACs has come from individual donors, suggesting that Super 
PACs act as conduits around existing individual contribution limits.46 
 
 40. Id. at 448. 
 41. Id. at 462. 
 42. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy posits that this decision accelerated the Roberts Court’s 
“deregulatory pace” and acted as a catalyst to solidify the Court’s role as legislator in 
our democracy. See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Deregulating Corruption, 13 HARV. L & POL’Y 
REV. 471, 488 (2019). Torres-Spelliscy further postulates that through the Court’s 
persistent intolerance of campaign finance laws, it has made “mincemeat out of the 
concept of corruption.” Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Trump’s Judicial Picks Are Gutting 
Campaign Finance Law, LAW360 (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/ 
1195479/trump-s-judicial-picks-are-gutting-campaign-finance-law. 
 43. Douglas M. Spencer & Abby K. Wood, Citizens United, States Divided: An 
Empirical Analysis of Independent Political Spending, 89 IND. L.J. 315, 330 (2014). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
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While Super PAC funding from individual donors is not a direct result of 
Citizens United, Spencer and Wood reveal that the Citizens United decision 
has also allowed for increased nonprofit political activism from groups 
such as 501(c) organizations.47 As the Center for Responsive Politics 
reported, in the 2006 federal election cycle, not a single dollar was spent 
by 501(c) organizations on independent expenditures or electioneering 
communications.48 However, the 2010 election cycle saw a tremendous 
uptick in nonprofit political activism, with forty-two percent of all outside 
spending originating from 501(c) organizations.49 
The recent abundance of political fundraising from groups such as 
nonprofits is particularly troubling as these groups are not required to 
disclose the source of their funding to the public, thereby leaving 
voters completely in the dark as to the identity of the donors who 
backed these powerful groups.50 Moreover, while Super PACs must 
disclose the identity of their donors, they are free to accept unlimited 
contributions from “dark money” nonprofits that are not held to the 
same disclosure standards.51 
Sarah C. Haan reveals that the 2012 election experienced a “sharp 
rise” in outside spending as compared to elections in the pre-Citizens 
United period.52 Citizens United allowed outside spending from Super PACs 
and 501(c) “dark money” organizations to increase dramatically.53 
However, Haan indicates that a large percentage of reported outside 
spending that occurred in the 2012 federal election also came from 
privately held, for-profit business entities.54 Similarly to the aforementioned 
concerns regarding undisclosed political spending from nonprofits, 
spending from privately held, for-profit business entities poses its own 
unique disclosure problems. As Haan discovered, more than forty 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Spencer MacColl, Citizens United Decision Profoundly Affects Political Landscape, 
OPENSECRETS (May 5, 2011), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/05/citizens-
united-decision-profoundly-affects-political-landscape [https://perma.cc/FM93-7JYY]. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Michael Greubel, Citizens United: 8 Years Later, FORDHAM J. OF CORP. & FIN. L.: 
BLOG (Mar. 7, 2018), https://news.law.fordham.edu/jcfl/2018/03/07/citizens-
united-8-years-later [https://perma.cc/5M2E-FWBL]. 
 51. Karl Evers-Hillstrom et al., A Look at the Impact of Citizens United on its 9th Anniversary, 
OPENSECRETS (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2019/01/citizens-united 
[https://perma.cc/K3L2-KX9M]. 
 52. Sarah C. Haan, Opaque Transparency: Outside Spending and Disclosure by Privately-
Held Business Entities in 2012 and Beyond, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 1149, 1150–51 (2014). 
 53. See Outside Spending, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/outside 
spending/fes_summ.php [https://perma.cc/9WRU-8J6Y]. 
 54. See Haan, supra note 52, at 1154, 1160. 
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percent of election-related spending by privately held, for-profit 
entities in 2012 was donated in a way that obscured the origin of the 
funds.55 Haan explains that a large percentage of these donations 
belonged to networks of affiliated private companies tracing back to 
one or more individual donors.56 While these for-profit business 
entities were required to comply with existing disclosure rules, voters 
were “likely to view these private companies’ donations as the 
commitments of many separate economic actors” while in reality the 
money came from the pockets of a few wealthy individuals.57 
Enhanced corporate spending skews voter impressions, undermines 
representation values, and yields a significant power asymmetry for rank-
and-file voters, who are relatively powerless against wealthy corporations. 
In addition to the aforementioned scholarship, empirical data compiled 
over the last decade clearly indicates a remarkable expansion in the scope 
of election spending by outside groups.58 As data collected from the 
midterm elections directly following the Court’s 2010 decision showed, 
Citizens United impacted federal elections rather quickly.59 For example, 
outside groups spent a modest $69,565,098 on political spending in the 
2006 midterm elections.60 However, in the months directly following the 
Citizens United decision in 2010, outside spending increased to 
$309,833,966.61 This upward trajectory has continued into the most 
recent 2018 midterm election, where political spending from outside 
groups reached an unprecedented $1,081,968,874.62 The influence 
that outside groups such as Super PACs and political nonprofits have 
had on our federal elections is exemplified further in data reflecting 
total outside spending from each election cycle.63 In the 2006 federal 
election cycle, outside spending capped out at $2,365,241.64 In 2010, 
just months after the Citizens United decision, total outside spending 
reached $14,868,086.65 The total outside spending in federal elections 
 
 55. Id. at 1173. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Outside Spending, supra note 53. 
 59. See Evers-Hillstrom et al., supra note 51. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See Total Outside Spending by Election Cycle, Excluding Party Committees, OPENSECRETS, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/cycle_tots.php [https://perma.cc/88JS-
F4LE] (charting a significant increase in outside spending in recent federal elections). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
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continued to skyrocket in the 2018 election cycle, as spending from 
outside groups increased to an astonishing $99,236,743.66 The 
amplification of spending from outside groups in the wake of Citizens 
United may be demonstrated via data compiled on competitive Senate 
races. The Brennan Center for Justice reports that outside expenditures 
increased from around $3 million per Senate race in 2010 to over $8 
million per Senate race in 2014.67 Overall, outside groups spent $486 
million on Senate races in 2014, a remarkable increase from the $220 
million that was spent just four years prior in 2010.68 The enhanced outside 
spending that has occurred in the aftermath of Citizens United has also helped 
to create the most expensive election cycles ever in our nation’s history.69 In 
the pre-Citizens United period, outside spending groups had only slight 
influence over Senate races. The 2008 Senate race in Minnesota, the most 
expensive race of the cycle, saw only $24,396,259 in spending from outside 
groups.70 This spending changed entirely post-Citizens United; outside groups 
repeatedly shattered spending records with each new election cycle.71 For 
example, in 2018, outside spending in Senate races reached a new extreme 
in Florida, with $92,878,026 spent by outside groups.72 
The astonishing growth of Super PACs in the years following the 
Citizens United decision is also supported by financial activity data from 
various election cycles over the past decade. In 2010, there were just 
eighty-three Super PACs who spent a total of $62,641,448 during the 
election cycle.73 These numbers completely transformed during the 
2018 election cycle, where 2395 Super PACs raised a total of 
$1,567,304,432, of which $822,068,922 was spent.74 Citizens United has 
allowed Super PACs to surpass national party committees as the top 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Neilan S. Chaturvedi, Outside Spending in Senate Races: Danger or Dud?, BRENNAN CTR. 
FOR JUST. (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-
opinion/outside-spending-senate-races-danger-or-dud [https://perma.cc/7D32-6VBF]. 
 68. Sarah Childress, Report: After Citizens United, Outside Spending Doubles, PBS: 
FRONTLINE (Jan. 14, 2015), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/report-after-
citizens-united-outside-spending-doubles [https://perma.cc/HZ4Y-4Z6W]. 
 69. Evers-Hillstrom et al., supra note 51. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. 2010 Outside Spending, by Super PAC, OPENSECRETS, https://www. 
opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2010&chrt=V&disp=O&type=S 
[https://perma.cc/9SUZ-MWVF?type=image]. 
 74. 2018 Outside Spending, by Super PAC, OPENSECRETS, https://www. 
opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2018&chrt=V&disp=O&type=S 
[https://perma.cc/44BV-UCC8]. 
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outside spending groups in federal elections.75 In fact, in the 2018 
election cycle, the top three outside spending groups were establishment 
connected Super PACs.76 Reflecting on the exorbitant outside spending 
that has occurred in years since Citizens United, Michael Greubel argues 
that it is unlikely that outside spending will be curbed anytime soon.77 
Greubel contends that the only way that spending from outside groups 
will subside in the coming years is through widespread bipartisan 
support and a complete reversal of Citizens United.78 
Another notable shift in spending that has transpired in the wake of 
Citizens United is in the judiciary, where money has shifted hands from 
candidates to independent groups.79 As Erenberg and Berg reveal, 
candidate fundraising fell to just over $27 million in 2009 to 2010, 
which is significantly lower than the $33.2 million that candidates 
raised four years prior.80 Judicial retention elections also reflect an 
enhancement of judicial spending. As Erenberg and Berg describe, 
“judicial retention elections before 2010 were sleepy affairs, immune 
to big-money politics.”81 However, they warn that independent 
expenditures in future judicial elections may routinely overtake 
candidate spending as partisan and special interests attempt to gain 
influence over American courts.82 
Alicia Bannon contemplates the consequences that enhanced 
independent expenditures pose to the fairness and integrity of judicial 
races. Bannon contends that judicial races had become very similar to 
ordinary elections even in years prior to Citizens United, as “wealthy 
special interest groups have increasingly turned their attention, and 
wallets, to judicial races.”83 However, Bannon explains that Citizens 
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 82. Id. at 518. Erenberg and Berg discuss the 2010 retention election contest in 
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United eliminated campaign finance restrictions in states where they 
existed, maintained the legal status quo in states where they did not, 
and foreclosed any future reforms from coming to fruition.84 
Functionally, Citizens United became a “one-way ratchet” for states and 
the regulation of money in judicial elections.85 As a result, Citizens 
United made it easier for interest groups to influence federal elections 
via shell organizations and nonprofit groups.86 However, these groups 
soon turned their attention to spending in state elections, particularly 
at the supreme court level. Bannon argues that the “composition and 
transparency of spending in judicial races” has seen the most significant 
effect,87 as outside groups who do not disclose their donors have 
flooded judicial elections at the state level.88 
Bannon warns that this transformation poses serious risks to the 
fairness and integrity of state courts. She urges that spending via 
nontransparent outside groups “can obscure the identity of powerful 
interests seeking to shape courts’ ideological composition, interests 
which may have a strong economic interest in how state courts rule on 
important legal issues, or even a direct stake in pending litigation.”89 
This is particularly problematic for the sake of judicial integrity as it 
deprives the voting public of the information necessary to assess the 
motives and credibility of the special interest groups that seek to shape 
their own state courts.90 As Bannon concludes, “[p]olitical and special 
interest pressure, if not adequately checked, threatens this basic 
promise of equal justice, undermining both the appearance and reality 
of fairness in state court systems.”91 Adam Skaggs from the Brennan 
Center for Justice also reflects these concerns as he highlights that 
corporations and special interests have a very obvious incentive to 
support judges they believe they will come before.92 Skaggs notes that 
 
 84. Id. at 176. 
 85. Id. (quoting James Sample, Retention Elections 2010, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 383, 393 (2011)). 
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 89. Id. at 180. 
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ON JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2 (2010), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-
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this type of conflict of interest puts increased pressures on independent and impartial judges; 
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at the state level, this incentive arises in high courts where a majority 
or swing vote can determine the outcome of multi-million-dollar 
claims.93 Unsurprisingly, business interests and lawyers make up almost 
two-thirds of all contributions to state supreme court candidates.94 
Erwin Chemerinsky underscores the disturbing influence that 
exorbitant corporate spending in judicial elections poses to our 
American democracy, as thirty-nine states have some form of judicial 
elections.95 This record spending in judicial races creates not only the 
perception but, often times, the actuality of pay-to-play justice in state 
courts.96 While Chemerinsky argues that we may see regulations in 
elections within the judicial realm in the future,97 the reality is that 
judicial elections are here to stay. This begs the question as to how the 
Supreme Court will treat campaign finance in the judicial context 
should the issue come before it. 
Richard Hasen examines another significant democratic consequence 
that has arisen in the wake of Citizens United: judicial incoherence within 
the Supreme Court. When the Court decided Citizens United in 2010, the 
majority celebrated its opinion as a return to Buckley v. Valeo,98 the so-
called “fountainhead” of campaign finance jurisprudence.99 However, 
Hasen argues that, in reality, this supposed harmony will only amplify 
incoherence within the Court’s campaign finance doctrine as the 
 
the public is forced to rely on judges’ duty to act in good faith and remove themselves from 
conflict situations. 
 93. Id. A palpable consequence of justice being sold to the highest bidder. 
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 95. Erwin Chemerinsky, Richard Hasen & James Sample, Citizens United Impact 
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 96. Id. at 691. 
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that the recusal standard in Caperton requires such an egregious problem that the 
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 98. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 99. Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. 
REV. 581, 583 (2011). 
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Court is unlikely to take the decision to its most extreme ends.100 Hasen 
explains that the Court’s “narrow, crabbed, view of corruption”101 and 
rejection of the antidistortion rationale in Citizens United will force the 
Justices to proclaim that limits may never be placed on money in 
politics, if they wish to maintain doctrinal coherence.102 However, this 
is not the path that the Court will likely take, particularly in areas such 
as foreign-initiated spending, spending in judicial elections, and 
reasonable limits on campaign contributions made directly to 
candidates.103 Hasen posits that the Court will ignore the inconsistent 
portions of its Citizens United ruling if it wishes to impose sensible and 
appealing spending limits because the justifications for these limits will 
come in the form of the antidistortion and anticorruption rationales 
that the majority emphatically rejected in Citizens United.104 This 
inconsistency will ultimately delegitimize the judicial system as 
coherence on the highest court in the land has both doctrinal and 
theoretical importance within our judiciary.105 
For some, the majority’s ruling in Citizens United is lauded as a 
powerful victory for free speech and a landmark for political 
freedom.106 As Joel Gora asserts, Citizens United reaffirmed that the 
“core purpose of the First Amendment is to guarantee that the people, 
not the government, get to determine what they want to say . . . .”107 
This notion stands in stark opposition to the views of other scholars 
such as Stephen Feldman, who categorizes Citizens United as an attempt 
by the Roberts Court to promote its probusiness agenda, allowing the 
private sphere to subsume the public and in turn endangering our 
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democratic system.108 The ramifications that have stemmed from the 
Citizens United decision have unquestionably undermined public 
confidence in key aspects of the democratic system, including the 
integrity of the government and the fairness of the judiciary.109 
This perceived consequence is supported by empirical data 
conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2018, which indicates that there 
is overwhelming bipartisan support for limits on political campaign 
spending amongst most Americans.110 The research indicates that seventy-
seven percent of the public believes that there should be limits on the 
amount of money individuals and organizations can spend on political 
campaigns.111 Moreover, this research demonstrates that roughly seven-
in-ten people believe that people who contribute more money to elected 
officials have more influence than others who do not contribute as 
much.112 This research clearly exemplifies the public’s lack of confidence 
in the most intrinsic values of our democracy. 
While disheartening, Richard Hasen interestingly points out the 
importance that public opinion has over the Supreme Court. Hasen 
posits that the Justices do in fact care about what the public thinks and 
respond directly to public pressures as a result.113 With this in mind, Hasen 
argues that it is unlikely that the Court will move in an extreme direction 
either way when it comes to the future of campaign finance decisions.114 
However, the demographic of the Court is transforming in an unnerving 
way as the conservative bloc gains power, making it unclear whether 
Hasen’s argument will hold true in the years to come. 
While Hasen’s assertion may address the Supreme Court’s 
receptiveness towards the public, it does little to quell the legitimate fears 
that many have regarding the Court’s complete unwillingness to defer to 
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legislative judgment. As shown in the context of the Citizens United 
decision, the level of deference that the Court gives to legislative findings 
has grave consequences on the rule of law and the efficacy of American 
democracy. While Citizens United has become the face of money in politics, 
it is only the first of several Supreme Court decisions where the Justices 
have completely repudiated the extensive fact finding and wisdom of 
federal and state legislatures, in turn transforming the campaign finance 
landscape and democracy as a whole. 
B.   American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock 
In American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock,115 the Supreme Court 
was presented with an opportunity to reconsider its holding in Citizens 
United—an opportunity that the Court conclusively declined. 
At issue in the case was the constitutionality of Montana’s Corrupt 
Practices Act,116 which required that a “corporation may not make . . . an 
expenditure in connection with a candidate or a political committee that 
supports or opposes a candidate or a political party.”117 Specifically at issue 
was whether Citizens United applied to this Montana law. The law had 
been around since a 1912 ballot initiative and was considered part of 
the Montana political fabric.118 
In a per curiam decision, the Court’s five-to-four majority ruled 
“there can be no serious doubt that” Citizens United does apply, issuing 
a summary reversal.119 As Anthony Johnstone asserts, at that point in time 
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Citizens United was “settled law as to the states for little more reason 
than because the Court had said so.”120 Joseph Fishkin and William 
Forbath contend that the Court based its belief that there was “nothing 
new to see” on the premise that “the only aspect of the Constitution in 
play is a First Amendment liberty to speak and spend.”121 
After the Court’s decision in American Tradition, Montana state 
officials, as well as most of the Montana general public, responded with 
indignance and resistance.122 Stand With Montanans, a state-wide political 
organization, gained substantial support in the months following the 
Court’s decision to campaign for a national constitutional amendment 
that would prohibit campaign contributions from corporations.123 
The four dissenting liberal justices on the Court asserted that 
Montana should have at least been granted oral argument to provide 
the Court the opportunity to reconsider Citizens United’s application in 
the case, if not Citizens United itself.124 The dissent echoed the remarks 
of Justice Stevens in his dissent in Citizens United. In writing for the 
dissent, Justice Breyer emphasized the findings of Montana’s Supreme 
Court that the state had a compelling interest in limiting independent 
expenditures by corporations given the history and political landscape of 
Montana.125 By denying Montana the opportunity to brief and argue its 
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position, the Court deprived Montana the ability to empirically challenge 
the contention that unlimited and unregulated corporate spending 
actually corrupted politics.126 Michael Morely asserts, “[i]f the Court 
wished to categorically preclude any governmental entity from limiting 
independent expenditures as a matter of law, without regard to the 
existence of extrinsic facts, then it should have framed its conclusion . . . as 
a purely legal assertion, rather than a factually contingent holding.”127 
Christopher Terry and Mitchell Bard contend that Montana’s 
“missed opportunity is indicative of a larger problem that surrounds 
the Citizens United case: one of empirical evidence.”128 Empirical 
evidence, they believe, “would go a long way toward settling the debate 
on the case’s impact on political speech.”129 They further argue that 
empirical data provides the best opportunity to assess Citizens United 
without political or ideological bias.130 
Andrew Moshirnia and Aaron Dozerman similarly contend that the 
facts in American Tradition Partnership were integral to the outcome of 
the case—distinguishing it from its Citizens United counterpart.131 The facts 
illustrated Montana’s history of undue political influence, which 
unquestionably justified the state’s compelling interest in preventing 
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further corruption.132 Justice Breyer indicated in his dissent that he 
agreed, recognizing “that independent expenditures by corporations did 
in fact lead to corruption or the appearance of corruption in Montana.”133 
Critics of the Court’s decision in American Tradition Partnership 
concurred. The Brennan Center contends that the Court’s decision to 
strike down Montana’s law without so much as reviewing the extensive 
and powerful record was a “serious mistake.”134 The Montana Supreme 
Court, in its decision, even emphasized the importance of the facts, stating 
that “[i]ssues of corporate influence, sparse population, dependence 
upon agriculture and extractive resource development, location as a 
transportation corridor, and low campaign costs make Montana especially 
vulnerable to continued efforts of corporate control to the detriment of 
democracy and the republican form of government.”135 
C.   Arizona Free Enterprise Club v. Bennett 
A year after Citizens United and one year prior to American Tradition 
Partnership, albeit in a slightly different context within campaign 
finance law, the Court rejected an opportunity to endorse a 
democratically enacted public financing system in the case of Arizona 
Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett.136 This time, it was not 
the will of Congress that the justices were unilaterally rejecting, rather 
the will of the rank-and-file voters of Arizona.137 
Leading up to the decision, the idea of matching funds was generally 
considered the single affirmative mechanism which “made public 
financing politically and fiscally viable.”138 Supporters of public 
financing maintain that public funds enable politicians to “focus more 
on the interests of a broader cross section of the population,”139 work 
towards shifting politician’s attention away from the elite, and 
redevelop voter engagement in the process.140 
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However, the modern state of campaign financing made it so that a 
candidate who opted for total public financing over private financing 
was essentially a “sitting duck.”141 Thus, matching funds provisions were 
appealing in that they allowed the government to “dispense limited 
resources while allowing participating candidates to respond in races 
where the most debate is generated,” instead of needlessly spending 
money on low dollar races or noncompetitive races.142 
In 1998, Arizona voters approved Proposition 200, the Arizona 
Citizens Clean Elections Act.143 The act, inter alia, created a voluntary 
public financing system, such that candidates for state office who 
accepted public financing could receive additional money from the 
State in direct response to the campaign activities of privately financed 
candidates and independent expenditure groups.144 The system sought 
to equalize campaign funding and strip disproportionate power away 
from wealthy candidates and donors.145 Referred to as “trigger 
matching funds,” the concept enabled a candidate to receive public 
funding while not restricting their ability to raise money above the 
public spending limit.146 Many advocates referred to this system as the 
single “most effective tool ever enacted into law to induce candidates 
to opt in to public campaign financing.”147 
Despite the widespread appeal that the trigger matching funds 
system garnered, the Arizona statute was challenged by a group of 
Republican candidates and independent expenditure groups who 
argued that the provision penalized their speech and burdened their 
First Amendment rights.148 The candidates and independent 
expenditure groups asserted that the “looming threat of trigger 
matching funds” chilled their speech, an argument that was at least in 
part derived from a previous Roberts Court decision in Davis v. FEC.149 
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In Davis, the Court held that spending limits which triggered matching 
funds was a burden on free speech by discouraging candidates from 
raising additional funds.150 However, the Court’s desire to invalidate 
these laws on First Amendment grounds would fundamentally 
“misconstrue the meaning of the First Amendment’s protection of 
[free] speech,” in that it would establish a First Amendment right in 
outraising and outspending an opponent free from response.151 
Leading up to Free Enterprise, courts of appeals had been largely 
supportive of trigger matching funds.152 The First Circuit in the Daggett 
v. Commission on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices153 decision held 
that there is no right to speak free from response and that “the purpose 
of the First Amendment is to ‘secure the widest possible dissemination of 
information from diverse and antagonistic sources.’”154 The Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals forcefully wrote that matching funds provisions 
placed no limitations or punishment on politicians who exceeded the 
trigger limits and that their free speech was in no way infringed upon by 
simply providing their opponent with the tools to respond.155 
In Free Enterprise, the Arizona District Court granted an injunction 
against enforcement of the Arizona matching funds provision. On 
appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that 
any minimal burdens that the provision imposed on speech were 
justified by the state’s compelling interest in reducing quid pro quo 
corruption.156 The case then made its way to the Supreme Court, which 
delivered yet another shocking blow to American democracy. 
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, which held 
that the Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Act violated the First 
Amendment as it utilized public funds to support a candidate who the 
opposing candidate and their donors opposed.157 The majority’s 
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approach was controlled largely by the logic of Davis, which stated that 
the matching funds system “imposes an unprecedented penalty on any 
candidate who robustly exercises [his] First Amendment right[s].”158 While 
the majority recognized differences between the penalty imposed by the 
matching funds provision and the penalty imposed by the law struck down in 
Davis,159 the majority determined that the difference made the Arizona 
provision more constitutionally problematic.160 The Court reasoned that the 
matching funds provision penalized a candidate or independent 
expenditure group who vigorously exercised their right to use funds to 
finance campaign speech as it triggered a guaranteed financial payout to the 
publicly funded candidate that the candidate or group directly opposed.161 
The State of Arizona, the Clean Elections Institute, and the U.S. 
government offered several arguments to justify the existence of any burdens 
imposed by the provision, all of which the Court emphatically denied.162 Most 
notably, the majority rejected Arizona’s interest in leveling the playing field 
to justify any undue burdens on protected free speech.163 Chief Justice 
Roberts opined that “in a democracy, campaigning for office is not a game” 
and “[t]he First Amendment embodies our choice as a Nation that, when 
it comes to such speech, the guiding principle is freedom—the ‘unfettered 
interchange of ideas’—not whatever the State may view as fair.”164 The 
majority completely negated the possibility of quid pro quo corruption or 
the appearance thereof because the independent expenditures were not 
formally coordinated with a candidate and the candidates and groups were 
separated.165 Yet again completely rejecting a legislative attempt at 
equalizing access to democracy.166 
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Writing for the dissent, Justice Kagan defended the public financing 
of elections as a potent mechanism that preserves the independence of 
elected officials who are not beholden to the interests of wealthy 
donors.167 The dissent rebuked the majority for conveying the matching 
funds provision as a restraint on electoral speech as the statute did not 
impose a ceiling on speech nor did it prevent anyone from speaking.168 
The dissent contended that the petitioners were motivated by a desire 
to quash the speech of others in order to have the field to themselves.169 
Justice Kagan averred that the majority erred in holding that the 
government substantially burdened speech, particularly because the 
matching funds provision in fact promoted additional speech from 
publicly financed candidates.170 The dissent concluded by exclaiming 
that the state’s compelling interest in attacking corruption and the 
appearance thereof in the state’s political system was on the “very face 
of Arizona’s public financing statute,”171 and the majority’s personal 
distaste for “level[ing] the playing field” did not constitute a viable 
excuse to strike down the Arizona law.172 
Just as in the post-Citizens United context, the Free Enterprise decision 
unleashed a string of detrimental effects on our democratic system. In 
the wake of the decision, trigger matching funds across the nation were 
quickly eliminated, and certain states entirely repealed public 
financing systems altogether.173 Conservative lawmakers also seized on 
the opportunity to increase state-level contribution limits, removing 
any remaining incentives for candidates to opt into running a publicly 
financed campaign.174 Empirical evidence from Arizona demonstrates 
how participation in publicly financed elections completely 
transformed as a result of the Free Enterprise decision. In 2008, the year of 
the last general election in Arizona to have the trigger matching funds 
provision, sixty-seven percent of candidates participated in the public 
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financing system.175 By 2014, three years after the decision, this number 
dropped to a modest twenty-eight percent.176 As David Cantelme 
contends, the 2014 election cycle revealed the significant impact that the 
decision had on Arizona politics as “dark money” flowed into elections 
and the state public funding system neared utter collapse.177 
D.   McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission 
As part of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA),178 
Congress established aggregate limits on campaign contributions.179 In 
doing so, Congress hoped to restore public confidence in the political 
system.180 The limits increased over time and were amended by the 
BCRA.181 The most recent limits capped contributions to candidates for 
federal office at $48,600, and contributions to party committees at 
$74,600.182 Plaintiff McCutcheon, a major Republican Party donor, brought 
suit challenging the constitutionality of the aggregate limits.183 
The Court previously addressed FECA campaign contribution limits in 
Buckley v. Valeo. In that case, the Court held that the limits were constitutional 
when aimed at protecting against quid pro quo corruption.184 Buckley also 
held that aggregate campaign limits, then $25,000, were constitutional.185 
Although the limits imposed a “modest restraint upon protected political 
activity,” they were justified to prevent evasion of the individual donation 
limit.186 For example, a donor could make unearmarked donations to 
committees, which would then donate to a particular candidate.187 Thus, the 
Buckley Court saw aggregate limits as no different than the individual limits.188 
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The McCutcheon Court, however, held that the aggregate limits 
implicated significant First Amendment interests.189 Contributing 
money to political candidates is one way people participate in 
democracy, the Court held. Aggregate limits impose more than a mere 
“modest restraint” on this right as they effectively penalize the 
individual donor who wishes to contribute to multiple candidates, so 
this donor might have to give less than he wishes to certain candidates 
to comply with the limit.190 
Under McCutcheon, Congress may only suppress campaign speech to 
target quid pro quo corruption. The Court acknowledged that the line 
between quid pro quo corruption and general influence can be blurry.191 
However, it rejected the idea that aggregate limits target such 
corruption.192 Furthermore, the Court held that Congress may not suppress 
campaign speech to equalize the electoral opportunities or financial 
resources of candidates.193 McCutcheon, therefore, reemphasized the 
holding in Free Enterprise. 
McCutcheon did leave in place limits on contributions to an individual 
candidate.194 However, the decision dramatically increased the amount of 
money that a donor can contribute during an election cycle. Previously, 
aggregate limits capped total contributions at approximately $123,000.195 
Few people met this limit.196 During the 2012 election, only 644 people 
nationwide hit the aggregate limit.197 However, with the removal of 
aggregate limits and only the cap on individual contributions remaining, 
the total amount an individual can contribute during a campaign cycle 
increased to over $2.4 million.198 Therefore, the McCutcheon decision 
benefitted an extremely small bloc of American political donors. 
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Adam Lamparello notes that the First Amendment is silent on campaign 
finance issues, including aggregate limits.199 He contends, therefore, that the 
Court should have taken a “pragmatic approach” and deferred to Congress’s 
judgment that such limits were necessary.200 He also argues that the Court 
could have upheld aggregate limits under a “time, place, and manner” type 
regime.201 Unfortunately, like the other cases discussed in this Article, the 
Court refused to defer to Congressional judgment. 
There is a nontrivial possibility that the Supreme Court will 
eventually strike down all campaign contribution limits. At least one 
justice supports this view. Justice Thomas, concurring in McCutcheon, 
argued that Buckley v. Valeo should be overruled in its entirety and that 
all campaign contribution limits violate the First Amendment.202 
Following McCutcheon, it is inevitable that the crux of Buckley, the 
constitutionality of the limit on contributions to political candidates, 
will come before the Court.203 
This is far from mere speculation. Paul Clement is currently petitioning 
the Court to review the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Thompson v. Hebdon.204 
That decision upheld Alaska’s $500 limit on campaign contributions.205 
Clement argues that the limit is too low.206 If the Court grants certiorari 
and reverses the Ninth Circuit’s decision, it would “hasten a world in 
which individuals could give unlimited sums directly to candidates, buying 
all the ingratiation and access they want.”207 
Clement’s concern is warranted in light of the Court’s previous 
decisions and recent Trump appointments to the bench. As of September 
2019, 150 Trump appointees had been confirmed to the federal judiciary, 
including Justices Kavanaugh and Gorsuch, who have expressed 
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considerable hostility towards campaign finance regulations.208 These 
Justices are likely to team up with Chief Justice Roberts, who equated 
the right to donate money with the right to vote in the McCutcheon 
decision.209 Certainly, the current conservative majority will further 
campaign finance deregulation.210 
As Justice Breyer lamented in his dissent, McCutcheon 
is a decision that substitutes judges’ understandings of how the political 
process works for the understanding of Congress; that fails to recognize 
the difference between influence resting upon public opinion and 
influence bought by money alone; that overturns key precedent; that 
creates huge loopholes in the law; and that undermines, perhaps 
devastates, what remains of campaign finance reform.211 
On the other hand, defenders of McCutcheon contend that the decision 
enables greater contributions to party committees, which soaks up some of 
the spending that was going to outside groups.212 Under this rather cynical 
view of campaign finance, the flow of big money must go somewhere, so it 
may as well go to the more well-known entity. However, as Michael Kang 
argues, this simply leads to “party-based” corruption rather than individual 
corruption.213 Under this theory, the parties act as wide networks through 
which large donations are filtered.214 While quid pro quo corruption still 
occurs, it becomes more attenuated and difficult to prove.215 
These campaign finance decisions have increased the concentration of 
political power in the rich and powerful. As Stephen Feldman argues, the 
Roberts Court has turned American democracy into “Democracy, Inc.”216 
This Court has been the most probusiness since World War II, favoring 
corporations even when evidence proves it harmful to the representation-
reinforcing values central to the democratic system and ultimately 
undermining the confidence of the American people in the political system. 
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E.   McDonnell v. United States 
One of the threads that ties the Court’s decisions in Citizens United v. 
FEC, Arizona Free Enterprise v. Bennett, and McCutcheon v. FEC together is the 
majority’s perfunctory invalidation of statutes targeted at the scourge of 
quid pro quo corruption that has plagued our democratic institutions. 
The Court was again provided with the opportunity to admonish quid pro 
quo corruption in the context of a high-profile gubernatorial bribery 
charge in McDonnell v. United States.217 However, the Court refused to 
acknowledge the existence of this blatant corruption, delivering yet 
another shocking blow to the efficacy of our democracy.218 
At issue in McDonnell was the proper interpretation of the federal 
bribery statute 18 U.S.C. § 201. The federal bribery statute was enacted 
in 1962 to strengthen criminal laws on bribery, graft, and conflicts of 
interest.219 The extensive legislative history behind the 1962 bill reveals that 
both Congress and President John F. Kennedy sought to pass the law in order 
to raise ethical standards and increase public confidence in government.220 
18 U.S.C. § 201 makes it a crime for a public official to directly or 
indirectly corruptly demand, seek, receive, accept, or agree “to receive 
or accept anything of value” in exchange for “being influenced in the 
performance of any official act.”221 For purposes of the statute, an 
“official act” is defined as “any decision or action on any question, matter, 
cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, 
or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such official’s 
official capacity, or in such official’s place of trust or profit.”222 
The interpretation of this statute became relevant in 2009, when 
Governor Robert McDonnell and his wife began their interactions with 
businessman Jonnie Williams during McDonnell’s gubernatorial 
campaign.223 From the onset of his campaign, Governor McDonnell 
focused heavily on promoting business and fostering economic 
development in Virginia.224 This caught the attention of Jonnie 
Williams, the CEO of a Virginia-based company, Star Scientific. 
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Williams wanted local universities to perform research on the 
nutritional supplement, Anatabloc, to determine its health benefits and 
ultimately obtain FDA approval of Anatabloc as an anti-inflammatory 
drug.225 In exchange for help in advancing this agenda, Williams entered 
into a close relationship with McDonnell in that he provided monetary 
loans and other benefits to McDonnell to help him through his financial 
struggles.226 In return for this monetary assistance, Governor McDonnell 
set up meetings for Williams with state agencies, held luncheons with 
university researchers, and even suggested that Anatabloc be included in 
state employees’ healthcare plans.227 
The scope of the financial assistance increased significantly as Williams 
provided McDonnell and his wife with various gifts, including shopping 
sprees, expensive vacations, designer watches, and a loan to help with their 
daughter’s wedding.228 By the end of their relationship, Williams gave 
$175,000 to the McDonnells in loans, gifts, and other benefits.229 
In January of 2014, federal prosecutors indicted McDonnell and his 
wife on federal bribery charges while Williams received immunity in 
exchange for his testimony.230 To convict the McDonnells, it was 
incumbent on the government to prove the Governor committed, or 
agreed to commit, an “official act” in exchange for financial benefit 
like the gifts and loans Williams provided.231 The government cited at 
least five instances in which the Governor committed an “official act” 
for Williams, including hosting events, arranging meetings, and 
contacting government officials on his behalf.232 
Controversy arose surrounding how the jury would be instructed as to 
what constituted an “official act” under the statute.233 The district court 
instructed the jury according to the government’s understanding of an 
“official act.”234 In order to convict McDonnell using the government’s 
definition, he would have had to agree to “accept a thing of value in 
exchange for official action.”235 However, McDonnell’s defense team 
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objected to this instruction, arguing that merely arranging an event or a 
meeting, standing alone, is not an “official act.”236 McDonnell’s team 
furthered its argument by explaining that “official acts” should relate to a 
specific gubernatorial decision, enumerating issuing a license, awarding a 
contract, passing a law, or implementing a regulation.237 
The Supreme Court—in a unanimous decision written by Chief Justice 
Roberts—ruled that the government’s interpretation of an “official act” was 
too broad as it encompassed nearly “any decision or action, on any question 
or matter” that is pending at any time or can be brought before any public 
official.238 According to the Court, a more circumscribed interpretation was 
necessary.239 The Court averred that the proper interpretation of an 
“official act” is a decision or action on a “question, matter, cause, suit, 
proceeding or controversy. The ‘question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding 
or controversy’ must involve a formal exercise of governmental power . . . . 
[i]t must also be something specific and focused that is ‘pending’ or ‘may 
by law be brought’ before a public official.”240 Under this “proper” 
definition, the Court concluded that merely setting up a meeting, hosting 
an event, or calling another official is not a decision or action on any 
of the questions or matters before the Court.241 
The Court also contemplated the constitutional concerns that the 
government’s interpretation of “official act” raised.242 The Court 
proffered that under the government’s overly broad interpretation, 
nearly anything a public official did would count as a quid pro quo.243 
Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the government’s interpretation 
could “cast a pall of potential prosecution” over day-to-day relationships 
between conscientious public officials and their constituents.244 The 
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Court feared such a situation would cause officials and citizens alike to 
refrain from participating in democratic discourse and chill interactions 
that are typical in a representative government.245 
Yet, it is hard to reconcile the fact that the Court unanimously 
recognized $175,000 in gifts and loans from Williams to the McDonnell 
family as a “normal” constituent relationship under a representative 
government.246 This appears to be an utter failure by the Court to fully 
gauge the difference between normal day-to-day constituent services 
and the totality of the conduct by Governor McDonnell, which clearly 
amounted to quid pro quo corruption. 
The result of the McDonnell decision was a collective sigh of relief from 
lobbyists and anticampaign regulation activists.247 While there was some 
disagreement as to how far the decision would reach, it was universally agreed 
that McDonnell was a further relaxation of rules for lobbyists and politicians.248 
Certain scholars concurred with the Court’s conclusion that the link between 
the gifts given to the Governor and his undertaking of an “official act” was 
tenuous.249 Yet, others saw the McDonnell decision for what it was—another 
judicial step that eroded institutions intrinsic to representative democracy. As 
the leader of one watchdog group bemoaned, “the repercussions are 
massive. . . [t]his case was a critical test, and the [C]ourt failed.”250 
II.    VOTING RIGHTS 
The Court’s undermining of representation-reinforcing values during 
the decade was definitely not limited to the campaign finance arena. The 
Court struck a brutal blow to voting rights in Shelby County v. Holder and a 
lesser, but still significant, one in Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute. 
Then, as the decade of democracy’s demise neared its conclusion, the 
Court shut the doors of federal courts to partisan gerrymandering claims 
in Rucho v. Common Cause. In isolation, each of these decisions 
undermines voting rights. In the aggregate, they are a democratic disaster. 
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In 1965, Congress passed the landmark Voting Rights Act (VRA)251 in 
response to the segregationist era voter suppression tactics that remained 
as the influence of Jim Crow began to recede through the South.252 The Act 
required covered jurisdictions to seek preclearance from federal authorities 
prior to changing their voting procedures.253 The Supreme Court has 
described a covered jurisdiction as “those States or political subdivisions 
that had maintained a test or device as a prerequisite to voting as of 
November 1, 1964, and had less than 50 percent voter registration or 
turnout in the 1964 Presidential Election.”254 This encompassed the 
entirety of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, 
Virginia, as well as scattered counties throughout the country.255 
The preclearance provision required a covered jurisdiction to obtain 
permission from federal authorities, either the D.C. District Court or 
the U.S. Attorney General’s Office, before making any changes to 
voting procedures.256 In seeking preclearance, a covered jurisdiction 
had the burden to show that the change in voting procedure had 
“neither ‘the purpose [nor] the effect of denying or abridging the 
right to vote on account of race or color.’”257 The Court first upheld 
the VRA in South Carolina v. Katzenbach.258 In that decision, the Court 
ruled that the VRA was justified to address “voting discrimination 
where it persists on a pervasive scale.”259 Nearly forty-five years later, the 









 251. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437. 
 252. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309–15 (1966) (summarizing 
the legislative history behind the VRA, which documented the various kinds of 
legislative devices and tests used throughout the South to disenfranchise blacks, and 
stating that the VRA intended to eliminate racial discrimination from voting). 
 253. See Voting Rights Act § 5. 
 254. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 537 (2013). 
 255. Id. at 537 (citing 28 C.F.R. pt. 51 app. (2012)). 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. (quoting Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. at 439). 
 258. 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
 259. Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. at 538 (quoting Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308). 
1592 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:1559 
A.   Shelby County v. Holder 
In 2010, Shelby County, Alabama sought a declaratory judgment that the 
coverage formula and preclearance requirement were unconstitutional 
and sought a permanent injunction against their enforcement.260 The 
statute was upheld by both the District Court and the D.C. Circuit Court 
of Appeals before landing at the Supreme Court.261 
In a sweeping decision written by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court ruled 
that the VRA’s coverage formula was unconstitutional.262 The Court first 
cited its decision in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 v. 
Holder,263 where it expressed doubt about the coverage formula’s 
constitutionality in holding that “[a statute’s] current burdens must be 
justified by current needs . . . . [and any] disparate geographic 
coverage [must be] sufficiently related to the problem that it 
targets.”264 The Court then cited to facts that voter registration and 
turnout had more or less reached parity between blacks and whites in 
2006, that blacks were being elected to office in record numbers, and 
that black turnout even exceeded white turnout in five of the six 
covered states.265 Thus, the Court opined that the coverage formula 
violated the “‘fundamental principle of equal sovereignty’ among the 
States” because covered jurisdictions had to “beseech the Federal 
Government for permission to implement laws that they would 
otherwise have the right to enact and execute on their own.”266 
Central to the Court’s decision in Shelby County was its belief that 
“[o]ur country has changed,” thus rendering the coverage formula 
outdated and unnecessary.267 Counsel for Shelby County echoed this 
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sentiment by arguing that “the problem to which the Voting Rights Act 
was addressed is solved. You look at the registration, you look at the voting. 
That problem is solved on an absolute, as well as, a relative basis.”268 Justice 
Kagan pointed out the fundamental flaw in this argument by asking, 
“[y]ou said the problem has been solved. But who gets to make that 
judgment really? Is it you, is it the Court, or is it Congress?”269 
The extensive legislative history of the VRA and its subsequent 
reauthorization underscores why the Court should have deferred to 
Congressional judgment here. The VRA was reauthorized by Congress 
three times between its initial passage and 2006, when the VRA was 
extended for another twenty-five years.270 When the VRA came back up for 
reauthorization in 2006, Congress compiled a record with over 12,000 
pages of evidence as to why the VRA needed to be reauthorized along with 
the same coverage formula.271 The report, completed by the House 
Judiciary Committee, found that preclearance of covered jurisdictions had 
been a “vital prophylactic tool[] . . . [against new efforts] employed by 
covered . . . jurisdictions.”272 The report also found that since the previous 
authorization in 1982, the Department of Justice (DOJ) had objected to 
over 700 changes in voting laws that were determined to be 
discriminatory.273 In fact, there were more objections to voting changes 
between 1982 and 2004 than between 1965 and 1982.274 
Even the mere threat of preclearance was an effective deterrent 
against jurisdictions considering discriminatory changes. The DOJ, 
when it suspected a discriminatory motive, would send the jurisdiction 
 
Court said that “no one can fairly say that [the record] shows anything approaching 
the ‘pervasive,’ ‘flagrant,’ ‘widespread,’ and ‘rampant’ discrimination that faced 
Congress in 1965, and that clearly distinguished the covered jurisdictions from the rest 
of the Nation at that time.” Id. 
 268. Transcript of Oral Argument at 65–66, Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 
(2013) (No. 12–96). 
 269. Id. at 66. 
 270. Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. at 536–39. 
 271. H.R. Rep. No. 109-478, at 5 (2006). Congress clearly recognized the 
importance of this legislation because it “result[ed] from the development of one of 
the most extensive legislative records in the Committee on the Judiciary’s history.” Id. 
The investigation included ten oversight hearings before the Subcommittee on the 
Constitution which had oral testimony from thirty-nine witnesses, additional written 
testimony from the Department of Justice, government and nongovernmental 
organizations, and private citizens, and incorporated two comprehensive reports 
compiled by nongovernmental organizations. Id. 
 272. Id. at 21. 
 273. Id. at 36. 
 274. Id. at 6, 21. 
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a “More Information Request” (“MIR”).275 Since the 1982 
reauthorization, covered jurisdictions withdrew over 205 proposed 
voting changes after receiving an MIR.276 The report found that racial 
disparities in voter turnout and elected officials persisted in covered 
jurisdictions but that the preclearance provision was the direct cause 
of an increase in both turnout and the election of African American 
officials.277 On the heels of this report, Congress passed the 2006 
reauthorization with overwhelming bipartisan support: the Senate 
passed it 98–0; the House passed it 390–33; and Republican President 
George W. Bush enthusiastically signed it into law.278 
The Court emphasized the rigidity of a coverage formula that forced 
covered jurisdictions to “beseech the Federal Government for 
permission” to change their voting procedures.279 The Court, however, 
overlooked the flexibility afforded to covered jurisdictions through the 
“bailout” procedure. A covered jurisdiction that showed its compliance 
with the VRA for the previous ten years could lose its covered status.280 
The bailout provisions reflected Congress’s concern about subjecting 
jurisdictions to preclearance for extended periods of time.281 In 
reauthorizing the VRA in 1982, Congress expected that covered 
jurisdictions would take advantage of the bailout provision and that “few 
jurisdictions would remain covered 25 years later.”282 By 2006, eleven 
counties from Virginia successfully bailed out from covered status, thus 
demonstrating that “covered status is neither permanent nor over-broad” 
 
 275. Id. at 40. MIRs forced covered jurisdictions to either “(1) submit additional 
information to prove a change is non-discriminatory; (2) withdraw a proposed change 
from consideration because it is discriminatory; (3) submit a new or amended non-
discriminatory voting plan; or (4) make no change.” Id. at 40. 
 276. Id. at 41. 
 277. Id. at 12. 
 278. Press Release, The White House: President George W. Bush, Fact Sheet: Voting 
Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006 (July 27, 2006), 
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060727-
1.html [https://perma.cc/C77E-5WUJ]. “At least 13 laws were blocked by 
preclearance in just the 18 months prior to” the Shelby County decision. Max Feldman, 
A Chance to Revive the Voting Rights Act, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Oct. 23, 2019), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/chance-revive-voting-
rights-act [https://perma.cc/54F7-ARLE]. 
 279. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 544 (2013). 
 280. Id. at 539. 
 281. H.R. Rep. No. 109-478, at 10 (2006). In the 1982 reauthorization, Congress 
amended the bailout provision “to allow a political subdivision to terminate coverage 
independent of a covered State.” Id. 
 282. Id. 
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and that covered status is “within the control of the jurisdiction . . . .”283 
However, Congress was “disappointed” that more States did not take 
advantage of the bailout process over that twenty-five-year span.284 
Congress found that the lack of successful bailouts was “telling of the 
commitment by some of the covered jurisdictions to end discriminatory 
practices.”285 Thus, the Court’s portrayal of the coverage formula as 
“static, unchanged since 1965” is inaccurate.286 Liberalized bailout 
procedures allowed covered jurisdictions to control their own destiny. 
The fact that so many jurisdictions were unable to bail out “reinforces the 
congressional judgment that these jurisdictions were rightfully subject to 
preclearance, and ought to remain under that regime.”287 
Professor Ellen Katz defended the coverage formula and criticized the 
Court’s following statement: “if ‘Congress had started from scratch in 
2006, it plainly could not have enacted the present coverage 
formula . . . . [but] that is exactly what Congress has done.’”288 To the 
contrary, Professor Katz argues that “Congress was not starting from 
scratch in 2006. Instead, it was considering whether a remedy everyone 
agreed had been lawfully imposed should continue.”289 Congress 
concluded, based on the evidence it had compiled, that the coverage 
formula and preclearance were still necessary.290 Reauthorization of 
the VRA preserved the “opportunities to refine coverage through the 
bailout and bail-in procedures.”291 
The majority argued that “first-generation” barriers to voting (i.e., literacy 
tests, other devices that block ballot access) have largely been eliminated.292 
Therefore, “current conditions” in the covered states did not justify the 
coverage formula.293 The presence of “second-generation barriers” (which 
“affect the weight of minority votes”) does not “cure” the problem of the 
coverage formula, according to the majority opinion.294 
 
 283. Id. at 25. 
 284. Id. at 58. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 580 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 287. Id. 
 288. Ellen D. Katz, What Was Wrong with the Record?, 12 ELECTION L.J. 329, 330 (2013) 
(quoting Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. at 556). 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. (quoting Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. at 547). 
 293. Id. (quoting Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. at 553). 
 294. Id. at 331 (quoting Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. at 554). 
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Katz contends, however, that the VRA was always intended to prevent 
second-generation barriers. Second-generation practices, such as 
racial gerrymandering, “predate the VRA by decades.”295 Southern 
states used second-generation barriers in conjunction with first-
generation barriers throughout the Jim Crow era.296 Therefore, “the 
practices grouped as ‘second generation’ are not unrelated to the 
concerns that first animated Congress to enact the VRA. They were part 
and parcel of the practices the original statute targeted.”297 The coverage 
formula used lower voter turnout tests and devices as a “trigger” for 
preclearance.298 However, these “elements” “captured with remarkable 
accuracy” places in the South that also engaged in “second-generation” 
barriers to voting.299 “The statutory ‘trigger’ linked tests and devices to 
low participation, but the statute’s target was never so limited.”300 
The majority opinion “may signal deeper skepticism about 
congressional judgment” and “portend more rigorous examination of 
congressional action in the future.”301 
Wendy Scott argues that while Shelby County may have provoked an 
outcry, the decision was actually foreseeable.302 She points out that 
southern states actively circumvented the VRA throughout the Act’s 
history.303 States used “reapportionment, annexation,” “at-large voting 
schemes,” and “outright defiance of federal authority” to disenfranchise 
black voters.304 Some local officials have even “closed their registration 
offices to freeze the voting rolls.”305 Nonetheless, the Court often reacted 
to these practices with “ambivalence.”306 For example, in Allen v. State 
Board of Elections,307 Mississippi changed its voting procedures to 
discriminate against African-American voters but did not seek 
preclearance.308 The Court held that Mississippi did need to seek 
 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Wendy B. Scott, Reflections on Justice Thurgood Marshall and Shelby County v. 
Holder, 76 LA. L. REV. 121, 125 (2015). 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. at 131. 
 305. Id. at 132 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 314 (1966)). 
 306. Id. at 125. 
 307. 393 U.S. 544 (1969). 
 308. Scott, supra note 302, at 132; see also Allen, 393 U.S. at 571. 
2020] THE DECADE OF DEMOCRACY’S DEMISE 1597 
preclearance and did not order new elections.309 This left officials 
elected through an illegal voting scheme in power and advantaged by 
the benefits of incumbency.310 
In another example, the Court upheld a Virginia reapportionment plan 
that diluted minority voting strength because the population variances were 
“unavoidable.”311 The Court also upheld the City of Richmond’s annexation 
scheme under the VRA, which diluted minority voting strength.312 In City of 
Mobile v. Bolden,313 the Court upheld Mobile, Alabama’s at-large voting law.314 
A group of black voters challenged the law under the VRA, but the Court 
held that “‘political groups’ have no ‘constitutional claim to representation’ 
independent from ‘the right of a person to vote on an equal basis.’”315 Justice 
Marshall’s dissent noted that the at-large system “submerg[ed] electoral 
minorities and overrepresent[ed] electoral majorities.”316 
Another way Shelby County was foreseeable, according to Wendy Scott, was 
the Court’s imposition of “high standards for proving racial 
discrimination.”317 In Beer v. United States,318 the Court held that a plan 
violated the VRA if it led to a “retrogression in the position of racial 
minorities,” as compared with the existing plan.319 As Justice Marshall 
noted in his dissent, Congress enacted the VRA to prevent new voting 
plans that “perpetuate discrimination,” not to simply prevent existing 
discrimination from worsening.320 
Scott argues Shelby County is also unsurprising considering the 
Roberts Court’s commitment to “post-racial constitutionalism,” under 
which minorities no longer need to be protected from racial 
discrimination.321 Shelby County falls squarely within this tradition by 
holding that the “conditions that originally justified [the VRA coverage 
formula and preclearance] no longer characterize voting in the 
covered jurisdictions.”322 
 
 309. Scott, supra note 302, at 132; see also Allen, 393 U.S. at 572. 
 310. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 572 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 311. Scott, supra note 302, at 134 (discussing Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973)). 
 312. Id. at 135 (discussing City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975)). 
 313. 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
 314. Id. at 78. 
 315. Scott, supra note 302, at 137 (quoting City of Mobile, 446 U.S. at 78). 
 316. Id. (quoting City of Mobile, 446 U.S. at 105 (Marshall, J., dissenting)). 
 317. Id. at 138. 
 318. 425 U.S. 130 (1976). 
 319. Scott, supra note 302, at 139 (citing Beer, 425 U.S. at 141). 
 320. Id. (quoting Beer, 425 U.S. at 151 (Marshall, J., dissenting)). 
 321. Id. at 124–25, 144, 145. 
 322. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 535 (2013). 
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The conservative Justices echoed this sentiment during oral 
argument. Justice Scalia notoriously referred to the VRA as an example 
of “racial entitlement,” pointing out that “[t]here are certain districts 
in the House that are black districts by law just about now.”323 Racial 
entitlements, Scalia contended, are difficult to eliminate “through the 
normal political processes” once the entitlements are no longer 
needed.324 Kennedy, who sided with the conservative bloc, acknowledged 
that the coverage formula was upheld as rational and effective in South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach in 1966.325 However, “the Marshall Plan was very 
good, too, the Morrill Act, the Northwest Ordinance, but times change,” 
he argued.326 Counsel for Shelby County boldly claimed that “the 
problem to which the Voting Rights Act was addressed is solved. You 
look at the registration, you look at the voting. That problem is solved 
on an absolute, as well as, a relative basis.”327 The Court, by adopting 
this post-racial argument, “seemingly embraced the Plessy v. Ferguson 
concept that the continued existence of racism is a construct of the 
African-American imagination.”328 
Not everyone laments the Court’s holding.329 Cato Institute Director 
Ilya Shapiro contends that the Shelby County decision “underlines, 
belatedly, that Jim Crow is dead, and that American election law is 
ready to return to normalcy.”330 He argues that prior to the decision, 
the “widespread, official racial discrimination in voting ha[d] 
disappeared,” because the institutionalized and sanctioned racial 
discrimination was no longer in place throughout the country.331 He 
criticizes the “media and political elites” for suggesting otherwise and 
for focusing energy on the Court’s decision.332 He contends that 
because there is no overt act of disenfranchisement, there is no need 
for efforts to prevent “[r]acial discrimination in voting.”333 
 
 323. Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) 
(No. 12-96). 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. at 35. 
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. at 65–66. Justice Kagan replied, “You said the problem has been solved. But who 
gets to make that judgment really? Is it you, is it the Court, or is it Congress?” Id. at 66. 
 328. Scott, supra note 302, at 145. 
 329. See Ilya Shapiro, Shelby County and the Vindication of Martin Luther King’s Dream, 
8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 182, 191 (2013). 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id. at 192. 
 332. Id. at 185. 
 333. See id. at 188. But see Samuel Issacharoff, Beyond the Discrimination Model on 
Voting, 127 HARV. L. REV. 95, 104 (2013). Professor Issacharoff singles out “partisan 
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However, empirical data suggest that the coverage formula was, contrary 
to the majority’s holding and Shapiro’s analysis, “justified by ‘current 
needs.’”334 The Brennan Center for Justice found that previously covered 
jurisdictions “have engaged in recent, significant efforts to disenfranchise 
voters.”335 These jurisdictions have succeeded in enacting laws that restrict 
voting.336 Overall, Shelby County has had a “profound and negative impact” 
on voter participation in previously covered jurisdictions.337 
The Court in Shelby County only formally addressed the coverage 
formula and did not issue a holding on the preclearance requirement. 
However, without the coverage formula, section 5 is essentially a 
nullity. Thus, Shelby County “crippled” the VRA, and invited previously 
covered jurisdictions to “implement[] changes to voting practices that 
would have otherwise required preclearance.”338 The effects were 
immediately felt.339 Previously covered jurisdictions enacted voter 
identification laws, even in the absence of evidence of voter fraud.340 
Some localities limited early voting and certain polling locations.341 
 
battleground states such as Colorado, Florida, Ohio, and Pennsylvania,” as noncovered 
jurisdictions that “sought to implement restrictive voter access laws.” Id. at 104. 
Furthermore, “[t]he likelihood that a state would have introduced restrictive voter 
identification laws in recent years turns on one variable: Republican control of the 
state legislature.” Id. at 103. 
 334. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 550–51 (2013) (quoting N.W. Austin Mun. 
Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 198, 203 (2009)); see also The Effects of Shelby 
County v. Holder, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.brennancenter 
.org/analysis/effects-shelby-county-v-holder [https://perma.cc/S2TT-JYE4]. 
 335. The Effects of Shelby County v. Holder, supra note 334. 
 336. Id. 
 337. JONATHAN BRATER ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., PURGES: A GROWING THREAT 
TO THE RIGHT TO VOTE 1 (2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/ 
files/2019-08/Report_Purges_Growing_Threat.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2WT-ELL9]. 
 338. Scott, supra note 302, at 123. 
 339. Id. 
 340. See id. For example, “[w]ithin 24 hours of the ruling, Texas announced that it 
would implement a strict photo ID law.” The Effects of Shelby County v. Holder, supra note 
334; see also Rick Lyman, Texas’ Stringent Voter ID Law Makes a Dent at Polls, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
6, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/07/us/politics/texas-stringent-voter-id-law-
makes-a-dent-at-polls.html?_r=0%20 (discussing the Texas voter ID law, although federal 
courts would eventually strike down this law as discriminatory). But see Max Feldman, Voting 
Rights in America, Six Years after Shelby v. Holder, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (June 25, 2019), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/voting-rights-america-six-years-after-shelby-v-
holder [https://perma.cc/LC7Q-2ZR9] (noting that states including Alabama and 
Mississippi implemented photo ID laws, which had been previously barred due to 
federal preclearance; although other state laws, including Texas’, have been 
successfully challenged, not all state laws have been). 
 341. Scott, supra note 302, at 124. 
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North Carolina, for example, enacted an extremely restrictive voting 
bill only two months after the Shelby County decision. The bill required a 
photo ID to vote, limited early voting, “eliminated same day registration; 
restricted pre-registration; ended annual voter registration drives; and 
eliminated the authority of county boards of elections to keep polls open 
for an additional hour.”342 The Fourth Circuit struck this law down three 
years later under section 2 of the VRA.343 However, this three-year delay 
highlights the important function that preclearance served: “shift[ing] the 
benefit of time and inertia from the perpetrators of evil to the victim.”344 
Without preclearance, illegal voting laws like North Carolina’s can take 
effect for years before a court strikes them down under section 2.345 Of 
course, there is no guarantee that a court will even strike down such illegal 
voting laws under section 2, notwithstanding the “expensive and 
protracted” nature of the litigation to reach that junction.346 
Following Shelby County, voter suppression laws have left their mark 
on electoral outcomes. During the 2016 election, fourteen states had 
new voting restrictions in place for the first time.347 Reports suggest 
that the voter ID law in Wisconsin prevented nearly 45,000 people from 
voting.348 President Trump won the state by only 22,177 votes.349 
Milwaukee, a majority African American city, saw its voter turnout 
decrease by nearly 41,000 people.350 
 
 342. The Effects of Shelby County v. Holder, supra note 334. 
 343. Id. 
 344. H.R. Rep. No. 109-478, at 6 (2006) (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 
U.S. 301, 328 (1966)). 
 345. As Justice Ginsburg noted in her Shelby County dissent, this allows politicians 
elected under “illegal voting scheme[s],” to “gain[] the advantages of incumbency.” 
Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S., 529, 572 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 346. Scott, supra note 302, at 124; see also Feldman, supra note 278. 
 347. New Voting Restrictions in America, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Oct. 1, 2019), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/new-voting-restrictions-america 
[https://perma.cc/XW85-X8TS]. New restrictions on the right to vote impacted 
Alabama, Arizona, Indiana, Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. 
 348. Ari Berman, Rigged: How Voter Suppression Threw Wisconsin to Trump, MOTHER 
JONES (Nov.-Dec. 2017), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/10/voter-
suppression-wisconsin-election-2016 [https://perma.cc/6TLM-R8EG]. 
 349. Brooke Seipel, Trump’s Victory Margin Smaller than Total Stein Votes in Key Swing 
States, HILL (Dec. 1, 2016), https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/ 
308353-trump-won-by-smaller-margin-than-stein-votes-in-all-three 
[https://perma.cc/HTQ6-HU5L]. 
 350. Berman, supra note 348. Some blamed Hillary Clinton’s loss in Wisconsin on 
her “failure to campaign in the state,” or the populace’s “lack of enthusiasm” about 
her campaign in general. Id. 
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Previously covered jurisdictions have leapt at the chance to close 
polling locations.351 Arizona closed 212 locations.352 Texas closed 403.353 
In total, previously covered jurisdictions closed 868 polling locations in 
time for the 2016 election.354 
States also purged voters from voting rolls in record numbers following 
Shelby County.355 Between 2014 and 2016, states removed nearly sixteen 
million voters from the rolls—four million more than before the 2008 
election.356 Between 2016 and 2018, an additional seventeen million voters 
were purged from the rolls.357 Previously covered states purged voters at 
much higher rates than noncovered states.358 The Brennan Center calculates 
that between 2012 and 2016, “2 million fewer voters would have been purged” 
if previously covered jurisdictions purged at the same rate as noncovered 
jurisdictions.359 This trend has continued into 2018360 and 2019.361 
 
 351. See, e.g., Zak Cheney-Rice, Georgia Republicans Secure Another Victory in Their Voter 
Purge, N.Y. MAG. (Dec. 30, 2019), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/12/georgia-
republicans-voter-purge.html [https://perma.cc/V6NF-2VZR] (describing Georgia 
polling place closures). In the six years prior to the 2018 election, Georgia eliminated 
or relocated almost half of the state’s polling locations. Id. The impacts of the “closures 
and relocations” had a disproportionate impact and “were 20 percent more likely to 
be prohibitive for black voters than their white counterparts.” Id. (citing Mark Niesse 
& Nick Thieme, Precinct Closures Harm Voter Turnout in Georgia, AJC Analysis Finds, 
ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Dec. 13, 2019), https://www.ajc.com/news/state--regional-govt--
politics/precinct-closures-harm-voter-turnout-georgia-ajc-analysis-finds/11sVcLyQCH 
uQRC8qtZ6lYP [https://perma.cc/LN5U-T66T]); see also Ari Berman, There Are 868 
Fewer Places to Vote in 2016 Because the Supreme Court Gutted the Voting Rights Act, NATION 
(Nov. 4, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/there-are-868-fewer-places-to-
vote-in-2016-because-the-supreme-court-gutted-the-voting-rights-act 
[https://perma.cc/F79K-L2RG]. 
 352. Berman, supra note 351. 
 353. Id. 
 354. Id. 
 355. BRATER ET AL., supra note 337, at 1. 
 356. Joe Davidson, Almost 16 Million Voters Were Removed from the Rolls. We Should Be 
Alarmed, WASH. POST (May 15, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 
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05/15/f3de396a-7682-11e9-bd25-c989555e7766_story.html. 
 357. Kevin Morris, Voter Purge Rates Remain High, Analysis Finds, BRENNAN CTR. FOR 
JUST. (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/voter-purge-rates-remain-
high-analysis-finds [https://perma.cc/J7FE-T63Y]. 
 358. BRATER ET AL., supra note 337, at 1. 
 359. Id. 
 360. Morris, supra note 357. Up to 1.1 million fewer voters would have been purged 
between 2016 and 2018 if all counties purged voter rolls at the same rate. Id. Previously 
covered jurisdictions purge at a forty percent higher rate than noncovered jurisdictions. Id. 
 361. Cheney-Rice, supra note 351. On December 16, 2019, Georgia purged 300,000 
voters from the rolls. Id. Fair Fight Georgia, a group formed by former Georgia 
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Chief Justice Roberts stated that the Fifteenth Amendment is “not 
designed to punish for the past.”362 The coverage formula, in his estimation, 
did precisely that because it failed to reflect “current conditions.”363 To the 
contrary, data suggest what Congress knew when it reauthorized the VRA 
was that “current conditions” justified the continued use of the coverage 
formula. The millions of now disenfranchised voters in previously covered 
jurisdictions reflect this sad reality.364 
B.   Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute 
Faced with an antiparticipatory policy, the Supreme Court found its 
way back to legislative deference in Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute. 
Coincidence? Causation? The answer is impossible to prove, but as 
against the trend of aggressive judicial fact finding in the cases 
examined above, failing to at least acknowledge the correlation is the 
equivalent of putting one’s head in the sand. 
Congress passed the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA)365 to 
address both increasing voter registration and removing ineligible 
persons from the state’s voter registration rolls.366 The Act requires 
states to implement a program that makes a “reasonable effort” to 
remove those from the rolls who either died or changed their 
residence.367 It also includes various provisions to ensure that people 
are not improperly removed.368 The Act permits a state to remove a 
voter if a post card is sent to them to confirm their address, the card is 
not returned, and the voter does not vote in the next two general federal 
elections.369 The NVRA “treats the failure to return a card as some 
 
gubernatorial candidate Stacey Abrams, challenged the purge of 120,000 of those 
voters in response. Id. The state re-instated 22,000 voters who were removed from the 
voting rolls but refused to reinstate the other 98,000. Id. The District Court for the 
Northern District of Georgia upheld this decision on December 27, 2019. Hannah 
Knowles, A Federal Judge Will Not Reverse Georgia’s Decision to Purge 100,000 Voters, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 28, 2019, 5:34 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 
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 362. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 553 (2013). 
 363. Id. at 554. 
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 365. National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1317. 
 366. See Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1833, 1838 (2018). 
 367. 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(4)(2012). 
 368. § 20507(b)–(d). 
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evidence—but by no means conclusive proof—that the voter has moved.”370 
Under Ohio’s “Supplemental Process” law, the Ohio Secretary of State 
sends letters to registrants who have “not engage[d] in any voter activity” 
for two consecutive years.371 These registrants are removed if they do not 
return the card and “fail[] to vote in any election during the period of two 
federal elections subsequent to the mailing of the confirmation notice.”372 
The NVRA specifically states that the failure to vote may not serve as the 
sole predicate for that voter’s removal.373 
The Court upheld Ohio’s Supplemental Process under a textual 
analysis and, in doing so, rediscovered its respect for legislative 
findings. Counsel for the respondents argued that the failure to return 
a card is worthless as evidence that the addressee has moved because 
“[s]o many properly registered voters simply discard return cards.”374 
In response, the Court stated it was clear that Congress placed 
evidentiary value on a voter’s failure to return a card because it was one 
of only two requirements for voter removal under the NVRA.375 Justice 
Alito, in stark contrast to the Court’s lack of legislative deference in 
Shelby County, stated “[w]e have no authority to dismiss the considered 
judgment of Congress and the Ohio Legislature regarding the 
probative value of a registrant’s failure to send back a return card.”376 
Justice Alito criticized the dissenting justices for advancing policy 
arguments against Ohio and Congress, instead of simply interpreting 
the statute.377 His attempt to frame Husted as simply a “dry exercise in 
bureaucratic mechanics and statutory interpretation” is hardly 
surprising.378 The Supreme Court has employed this technique time and 
again, “turn[ing] a blind eye to the motivation behind, and effect of” laws 
that restrict the right to vote.379 As a result, those laws upheld by the Court 
 
 370. Husted, 138 S. Ct. at 1839. 
 371. Id. at 1840. 
 372. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3503.21(B)(2) (West 2020). 
 373. 52 U.S.C. § 20507(b)(2). 
 374. Husted, 138 S. Ct at 1845. 
 375. Id. at 1845–46. 
 376. Id. at 1846. 
 377. Id. at 1848. 
 378. The Supreme Court 2017 Term: Leading Case: Federal Statutes: National Voter 
Registration Act—Statutory Interpretation—Election Law—Husted v. A. Philip Randolph 
Institute, 132 HARV. L. REV. 437, 442 (2018) [hereinafter Supreme Court 2017 Term]. 
 379. Id. Justice Sotomayor similarly argues that the majority “entirely ignores the 
history of voter suppression against which the NVRA was enacted and upholds a 
program that appears to further the very disenfranchisement of minority and low-
income voters that Congress set out to eradicate.” Husted, 138 S. Ct. at 1865 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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have “serve[d] as models for states interested in restricting the 
franchise.”380 Husted is simply the latest example of this practice.381 
Husted is best understood in the context of America’s “history of 
voter suppression.”382 Post-ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, 
blacks were voted into local and federal office in record numbers.383 
During Reconstruction, voters elected over one thousand black men, 
including the first sixteen black congressmen.384 Their success was 
short lived.385 The end of Reconstruction led to a “a new era of voter 
suppression.”386 States used legal methods such poll taxes and literacy 
tests to deny blacks the right to vote.387 Blacks also faced “extrajudicial 
violence,”388 which states “tacitly condoned.”389 These practices 
“dramatically decreased black voter registration and turnout.”390 
Even though voting restrictions such as poll taxes and literacy tests 
were obviously designed to disenfranchise blacks,391 “the Supreme 
Court upheld them by focusing on their facial neutrality.”392 For 
example, the Court upheld a literacy test in Williams v. Mississippi393 
 
 380. Supreme Court 2017 Term, supra note 378, at 442. 
 381. Id. On September 6, 2019, Ohio purged 182,000 voters from its rolls. The state 
purged 158,000 of those voters for voter inactivity under the Supplemental Process. 
Rick Rouan, Vast Majority of the 180,000 Ohio Voters Purged Because They Didn’t Vote, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Sept. 30, 2019, 7:13 PM), https://www.dispatch.com/news/ 
20190930/vast-majority-of-180000-ohio-voters-purged-because-they-didnt-vote 
[https://perma.cc/WEF2-XCDU]. 
 382. Supreme Court 2017 Term, supra note 378, at 442. 
 383. Id. 
 384. Id. 
 385. Id. at 442–43. 
 386. Id. 
 387. Id. 
 388. Id. at 443. 
 389. See Zanita E. Fenton, Disarming State Action; Discharging State Responsibility, 52 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 47, 52–53 (2017) (discussing how state officials during the 
Reconstruction era inequitably enforced firearms laws to intentionally leave black 
citizens vulnerable to lynch mobs). 
 390. Supreme Court 2017 Term, supra note 378, at 443. 
 391. Id. at 442–43. See generally TOVA ANDREA WANG, THE POLITICS OF VOTER SUPPRESSION: 
DEFENDING AND EXPANDING AMERICANS’ RIGHT TO VOTE 17–20 (2012) (describing how 
Southern states in the Reconstruction era intentionally implemented poll taxes and literacy 
tests to suppress poor and uneducated black voters and administered the poll taxes and 
literacy tests discriminately to white and black citizens). 
 392. Supreme Court 2017 Term, supra note 378, at 443; see, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM 
JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 141 
(2004) (“The decision in Williams v. Mississippi (1898) rejected a facial challenge to a literacy 
test . . . on the ground that the legislative motive was irrelevant to constitutionality.”). 
 393. 170 U.S. 213 (1898). 
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because “it has not been shown that [the literacy test’s] actual 
administration was evil.”394 Other states were encouraged by the 
Court’s “initial willingness to permit voter suppression.”395 For 
example, months after the Court decided Williams, Democrats in 
North Carolina “organized an election day coup d’état” in which 
whites murdered “scores of black men, women, and children.”396 The 
leaders of the coup declared that they would “no longer be ruled and 
will never again be ruled, by men of African origin.”397 “By 1908, every 
ex-Confederate state had implemented” voter suppression laws.398 The 
Court routinely upheld these laws on technicalities rather than address 
the discriminatory intent behind the legislation.399 
In the 1903 decision Giles v. Harris,400 the Court upheld Alabama’s 
Constitution, which was devised to exclude blacks from the political 
process.401 The Court held that the plaintiffs could seek relief from 
their state government or Congress, but not the federal courts.402 In 
Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections,403 the Court upheld 
North Carolina’s literacy test.404 North Carolina justified the test as a 
way to prevent fraud.405 
On the heels of Shelby County and Husted, Republican-controlled 
states have found “new ways to prevent minority voters from reaching 
the polls.”406 Like the voter suppression laws of the past, the new laws 
are “cloaked with benign justifications like preventing fraud or 
ensuring faith in the democratic process.”407 They are “couched in 
racially neutral terms,” even though they target black voters.408 
 
 394. Supreme Court 2017 Term, supra note 378, at 443 (quoting Williams, 170 U.S. at 225). 
 395. Id. at 443. 
 396. Id.; see also Adrienne LaFrance & Vann R. Newkirk II, The Lost History of an 
American Coup D’État, ATLANTIC (Aug. 12, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
politics/archive/2017/08/wilmington-massacre/536457. 
 397. Supreme Court 2017 Term, supra note 378, at 443 (quoting HARRY HAYDEN, THE 
STORY OF THE WILMINGTON REBELLION 10 (1936), http://core.ecu.edu/umc/ 
wilmington /scans/ticketTwo/hayden.pdf [https://perma.cc/MB3W-42NU]). 
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 399. Id. 
 400. 189 U.S. 475 (1903). 
 401. Supreme Court 2017 Term, supra note 378, at 443–44. 
 402. Id. at 444. 
 403. 360 U.S. 45 (1959). 
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 405. Supreme Court 2017 Term, supra note 378, at 444. 
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Disenfranchisement of black voters is “a feature, not a bug” of these 
new laws.409 The Court, much like it did during the Jim Crow era, has 
“all but given its blessing to voter suppression.”410 By invalidating the 
VRA’s coverage formula for preclearance in Shelby County, the Court 
invited previously covered jurisdictions to continue to restrict minority 
voters’ “access to the polls.”411 In Abbot v. Perez,412 the Court upheld 
racially gerrymandered district maps in Texas.413 The Court used 
“hyper-technical language about jurisdiction and statutory 
construction.”414 However, the decision effectively gave election map 
drawers the green light to design maps that infringe upon the voting 
rights of minorities.415 In Gill v. Whitford,416 the Court “manufactured a 
procedural dodge” to uphold Wisconsin’s gerrymandered maps, 
despite clear evidence that the legislature gerrymandered the districts 
to dilute minority voting power.417 
Husted’s textual interpretation may be defensible, much like the 
facially neutral poll tax and literacy laws could be defended on textual 
grounds.418 Ignoring the broader context of voter suppression 
throughout the nation’s past when interpreting new facially neutral 
voting laws disregards the struggle of generations who risked their lives for 
voting rights.419 Like previous decisions that upheld voter suppression laws, 
Husted provides a “roadmap” for other states interested in suppressing 
minority voters.420 At least twelve Republican-controlled state legislatures 
have signaled their plans to enact similar voter purge laws.421 
In Shelby County, the Roberts Court invalidated overwhelmingly 
bipartisan legislation intended to protect minority voters.422 The Court did 
this despite extensive Congressional fact finding that indicated the 
 
 409. Id. 
 410. Id. at 445. 
 411. Id. 
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continued need for the coverage formula and preclearance.423 There, the 
Court showed no deference, at all, to Congress’s judgment. In Husted, 
however, the Court was willing to defer to legislative judgment. According 
to Justice Alito, the Court had “no authority to dismiss the considered 
judgment of Congress and the Ohio Legislature,” even though the link 
between moving and failing to return a letter is tenuous at best.424 
When faced with a law that expands democratic participation, like 
the VRA, the Court is unlikely to defer to legislative judgment that the 
law is necessary. When faced with a law that restricts democratic 
participation, the Court will have no problem deferring to legislative 
judgment. The combined effect of these judicial policies has had, and 
will continue to have, a devastating effect on our democracy. 
C.   Rucho v. Common Cause 
The Court struck its most recent blow to democracy in Rucho v. 
Common Cause.425 This case dealt with partisan gerrymandering in 
Maryland and North Carolina, where the map drawers did not bother 
to hide their insidious motives.426 In Maryland, the Democratic-
controlled legislature moved approximately 360,000 voters out of a 
traditionally Republican area with the explicit goal of “flipping” the 
district.427 In North Carolina, the Republican-controlled legislature 
gerrymandered the entire Congressional election map.428 Representative 
David Lewis, a districting committee co-chair stated, “I think electing 
Republicans is better than electing Democrats. So I drew this map to help 
foster what I think is better for the country.”429 The district courts in both 
cases struck down the gerrymandered maps as unconstitutional under the 
First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause.430 The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari, consolidated the cases, and reversed.431 
The Court held that partisan gerrymandering claims present a 
nonjusticiable political question because the Court lacks “judicially 
 
 423. Id. at 565–66 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 424. Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1833, 1846 (2018). 
 425. 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). 
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 427. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2493. 
 428. Id. at 2491. 
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discoverable and manageable standards” to resolve such claims.432 
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority,433 argued that partisan 
gerrymandering claims require judges to determine a “fair” amount of 
political representation for a party.434 However, federal courts do not 
have a “‘clear, manageable and politically neutral’ test for fairness.”435 
Fairness might be defined in different ways that lead to different 
results.436 The Court held that selecting a definition of fairness is 
“beyond the competence of the federal courts” because it “poses basic 
questions that are political, not legal.”437 Even if courts did have a 
“neutral baseline” from which to measure fairness, they would still lack 
a “discernible and manageable standard[] for deciding” the 
“determinative question: ‘How much is too much?’”438 
The Court also used originalist reasoning in support of its holding. The 
Framers, who were well aware of partisan gerrymandering, assigned 
districting to the state legislatures subject to Congressional regulation 
through the Elections Clause.439 Therefore, the Framers never envisioned 
the federal courts playing any role in districting, according to the 
majority.440 Federal courts, the majority held, have no authority to 
“reallocate political power between the two major political parties.”441 
The Court acknowledged that partisan gerrymandering is 
“incompatible with democratic principles.”442 This does not mean, 
however, that “the solution lies with the federal judiciary.”443 Instead, 
affected voters can rely on state statutes and constitutions to “provide 
standards and guidance for state courts” in partisan gerrymandering 
 
 432. Id. at 2496 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1961)). 
 433. Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined the majority opinion. 
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cases.444 Alternatively, the Court held, states may choose to adopt 
independent commissions to control the districting process.445 The 
Court also noted that Congress is free to reform partisan 
gerrymandering through the Elections Clause.446 
Justice Kagan posed a simple question in her blistering dissent: “Is this 
how American democracy is supposed to work?”447 Elections are supposed 
to reflect the sovereignty of the people over their representatives, she 
argued.448 Partisan gerrymandering, however, turns that idea on its head by 
allowing representatives to “cherry-pick voters to ensure their reelection.”449 
The result: Election Day is rendered “meaningless.”450 
Justice Kagan acknowledged that partisan gerrymandering has been 
a part of American elections since the country’s earliest days. However, 
advances in data science and technology ensure that modern 
gerrymandering—like the kind seen in North Carolina and 
Maryland—is far more effective than the “crude linedrawing of the 
past.”451 Both map drawers used advanced statistical models to create 
 
 444. Id. at 2507. North Carolina Democrats have filed a lawsuit challenging the 
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“voter-proof map[s].”452 “These are not your grandfather’s—let alone 
the Framers’—gerrymanders,” she argued.453 
Justice Kagan further contended that federal courts are capable of 
adjudicating partisan gerrymandering claims and that the District 
Court decisions are proof of this.454 These courts used their state’s own 
districting criteria, “apart from partisan gain,” as a neutral baseline 
from which to measure partisan gerrymandering.455 Then, the courts 
used a three-prong test for vote dilution to determine intent, effects, 
and causation—an “utterly ordinary” test for a lawyer to apply.456 The 
majority, oddly, claimed that federal courts are incapable of 
adjudicating these claims but that voters may turn to state courts for 
relief.457 Justice Kagan noted this inconsistency, asking “[i]f [state 
courts] can develop and apply neutral and manageable standards to 
identify unconstitutional gerrymanders, why couldn’t we?”458 
According to Justice Kagan, the majority’s decision is a stunning 
abdication of the Court’s duty under Marbury v. Madison459 to “say what 
 
 452. Id. at 2511–13. Justice Kagan noted that Dr. Thomas Hofeller, a Republican 
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the law is.”460 Indeed, the majority balked at the idea of “unelected and 
politically unaccountable” federal judges intervening in partisan 
politics.461 What the Court failed to account for, however, is that judicial 
review is not necessarily undemocratic or counter-majoritarian. As John 
Hart Ely argued in Democracy and Distrust, judicial review can actually be 
“representation reinforcing” when courts strike down undemocratic 
practices or statutes.462 Baker v. Carr463 and Reynolds v. Sims464, which 
established the one-person-one-vote principle, are clear examples of how 
judicial review can be representation reinforcing.465 Michael C. Dorf 
argues that “[c]ourts ought not, in the name of democracy, defer to 
legislatures in the drawing of district lines when the very complaint at 
issue charges that the lines they have drawn disrespect democratic 
principles. In such cases, an intervening court acts as the protector of 
democracy and majoritarianism.”466 
The Rucho Court’s legislative deference, therefore, is wholly 
inappropriate. The Court purports to protect the political process from 
judicial arbitrariness in defining a “manageable standard.”467 In doing so, 
however, the Court fails to protect that process by effectively green-lighting 
partisan gerrymandering,468 a practice that the majority acknowledges is 
“incompatible with democratic principles.”469 As Michael C. Dorf puts it, 
the Court “thr[ew] out the baby with the bathwater.”470 Voters who live in 
states without ballot initiatives or independent districting commissions are 
now forced to rely on their representatives—the ones who stand to benefit 
the most from partisan gerrymandering—for reform.471 
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As this Article has discussed, the Roberts Court is not always so 
hesitant to overturn legislative judgment.472 The underlying theme in 
these cases is that the Court will defer to the legislature when faced 
with an antiparticipatory policy. Thus, partisan gerrymandering, a 
practice that clearly threatens voter participation, earned the Court’s 
deference. Rucho, therefore, falls squarely within the Shelby County, 
Citizens United, and Husted trend.473 These cases demonstrate that the 
Roberts Court “simply do[es]n’t believe that political equality—the 
idea that Americans must be able to participate in the political process 
on a more or less equal footing—is a crucial value to be upheld.”474 
CONCLUSION 
The Court’s persistence throughout the past decade in overturning 
“outputs of the political process” has weakened American democracy. The 
deterioration began with the Court’s blockbuster decision in Citizen’s 
United, which bestowed upon already influential corporations the power to 
shape American democracy with limitless largesse.475 This decision had the 
decisive effect of quieting the voices of American citizens who seek to 
choose their elected representatives, a foundational right afforded to all 
Americans. The effects of Citizens United are enduring. 
This enduring impact was epitomized by the Court in its decision in 
American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock, in which it conclusively 
denied an opportunity to reexamine the Court’s Citizens United 
decision.476 In the eyes of the Court, Citizens United was settled law 
because it said so, period.477 This basis alone was enough for the Court 
to refuse to hear oral arguments on the issue and rather summarily 
declare that the case, in fact, posed an irrefutable issue. The Court 
similarly rejected an opportunity to endorse a democratically enacted 
campaign finance system in Arizona Free Enterprise Club v. Bennett despite 
the system’s proven ability to promote robust political campaigns.478 In 
holding that the matching fund law violated the First Amendment, the 
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Court triggered the repulsion of public financing systems across the 
nation—further demolishing the American democratic system. 
Faced with yet another opportunity in 2014, in McCutcheon v. FEC, to 
revitalize democratic values in the campaign finance sphere, the Court 
rejected the idea that aggregate limits target quid pro quo corruption 
and provided wealthy corporations the power to write blank checks—
supplanting the voices of millions of Americans as collateral.479 While 
a cap on individual campaign contributions remains in place, if the 
Court’s persistent actions over the past decade are any indication, it is 
certainly possible that if faced with this issue in coming years, the Court 
will eradicate all contribution limits. 
The Court again failed to admonish quid pro quo corruption—a pervasive 
issue that continues to plague our democratic institutions—in McDonnell v. 
United States.480 The Court reinforced the ubiquity of bribery by narrowly 
defining an “official act” and, in doing so, conferred immeasurable power to 
lobbyists and anticampaign regulation activists alike.481 
The Court did not confine its decade long assault on representation-
reinforcing values to campaign finance. Rather, the Court dealt blow after 
blow to voting rights as well. In Shelby County, the Court struck down the 
coverage formula of the VRA, effectively neutering the preclearance 
provision essential to the Act.482 The decision immediately impacted 
voting rights for the worse.483 Previously covered states enacted voter 
identification laws, limited early voting, closed polling locations, and 
implemented various other obstacles to voting.484 Section 2 remains in 
place, but it is entirely insufficient to attack the ever-evolving methods of 
voter disenfranchisement.485 In the Court’s eyes, the coverage formula was 
outdated and unnecessary because “[o]ur country has changed.”486 
However, 12,000 pages of legislative fact finding in support of this 
overwhelmingly bipartisan Act suggest otherwise.487 
The Court continued to undermine representation-reinforcement 
in Husted. This time, the Court confronted an antiparticipatory 
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policy—Ohio’s voter purge law, the Supplemental Process. The Court 
upheld the law, and as a result, 182,000 voters have been purged from 
the rolls.488 The Supplemental Process uses a voter’s failure to return a 
mailed card as evidence that the voter had moved.489 However, as 
Justice Breyer noted in his dissent, the numbers do not support this 
legislative judgment.490 Failing to return a card is essentially worthless 
as evidence that a voter has moved.491 Considering the Court’s total 
lack of deference to the extensive legislative fact finding in Shelby 
County, one might have expected the Court to disregard Ohio’s flimsy 
justifications here. Not so. The Court about-faced, and rubber-stamped 
the law, declaring that the Court had “no authority to dismiss the 
considered judgment” of the legislature.492 Faced with a law that 
restricts access to the democratic process, the Court suddenly 
rediscovered its respect for legislative judgment. 
In Rucho, the Court faced partisan gerrymandering claims and had 
yet another opportunity to reinforce representation values and protect 
the democratic process. Instead of providing that protection, the 
Court slammed the doors of the federal judiciary to partisan 
gerrymandering claims, holding that such claims present a nonjusticiable 
political question.493 According to Justice Roberts, federal courts lack a 
“‘clear, manageable and politically neutral’ test for fairness” to determine 
when partisan gerrymandering has gone too far.494 The Court held that 
the solution lies with Congress, state legislatures, or state courts.495 
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However, the Court offered no reason why state courts have jurisdiction 
to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims but federal courts are not. 
Furthermore, the Court failed to consider that modern map drawers use 
advanced computer programs and data to create “voter-proof map[s].”496 
Incumbent politicians use these maps to “cherry-pick voters to ensure their 
reelection.”497 As a result, voters feel a “sense of disenfranchisement,” and 
lose faith in the American system of representative government.498 
Over the past decade, the Court’s decisions in both the campaign 
finance and voting rights contexts have undermined representation-
reinforcing values by increasing the concentration of political power 
in the rich and powerful and, in turn, reducing the role of the average 
citizen in his or her democracy. 
As this Article was in its final edits during April of 2020, just prior to 
going to print, the Court intervened on the eve of Wisconsin’s primary 
election, in the midst of a global pandemic, to in the words of Justice 
Ginsburg, “prevent voters who timely requested absentee ballots from 
casting their votes.”499 The Court’s ruling required citizens to do the 
unimaginable: postmark an absentee ballot, that they had yet to receive, 
within twenty-four hours.500 
With a severe backlog of absentee ballot requests that had 
overwhelmed election officials’ capacity to mail the ballots to voters 
promptly, the Court made voting a matter of life or health.501 Voters’ 
only alternative to time travel? Stand in line, for hours, with hundreds 
of fellow should-have-been social distancing citizens, in the midst of 
the pandemic, at one of the few in-person polling locations that had 
not been preemptively closed due to the virus. Did the burden of this 
unconscionable choice fall equally on rich and poor? On black voters 
and white voters? Of course not. Did the Supreme Court’s five-to-four 
majority turn a blind eye? Of course it did. 
Thus it came to pass that on April 7, 2020, just ten years and three months 
removed from Citizens United, voters who wished to exercise the franchise 
were forced either to mail a timely requested absentee ballot that they had 
not yet received, or risk their health and that of others by voting in person. 
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Voters in Milwaukee, the city with the state’s most substantial black 
population, saw their normal allotment of one hundred eighty polling 
locations reduced to a mere five.502 
Five polling locations in the city of Milwaukee. 
Five votes on the Supreme Court. 
And as a coda reflective of the Court’s unwaveringly callous role in 
the Decade of Democracy’s Demise, it bears noting that, due to health 
concerns, the Supreme Court had been operating remotely since 
March.503 Thus, all nine of the justices’ votes were cast remotely—an 
option the five-member majority effectively and sadly fittingly denied 
to thousands of voters in Wisconsin. 
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